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The Hospital Board at Risk and the Need to
Restructure the Relationship with the Medical Staff:
Bylaws, Peer Review and Related Solutions
John P. Marren,* G. Landon Feazell,** Michael W. Paddock"
This extensive article is intended to introduce a central thesis to pose the
fundamental question for both our consideration and for a series of articles
to follow. That question is: "Does the current structure of the hospital
governing board and medical staff support and promote quality and
patient-centeredcare, or is it seriouslyflawed?"
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY CHALLENGES

The focus of this analysis is not intended to join the debate raging in the
United States about how many preventable deaths occur from medical
error. Rather, the issue is how shocking it is that we know so little about
health care quality - at the nationaland local levels. It is appalling that we
must extrapolate from small samples of data to consider crude elements
such as how many people are injured or die needlessly in American
hospitals annually.
American medicine, with its exceptionally trained and devoted
physicians and clinicians, and with all its technology and innovations, is
without parallel in the world. Yet the quality of health care in the United
* John P. Marren, partner of the law firm Hogan Marren, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, has more
than 28 years of experience in health care, including ten years of hospital administrative
experience prior to becoming an attorney. Mr. Marren received his B.A. from St. Xavier
University; his J.D. from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Additionally, Mr.
Marren is currently an Adjunct Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
**Mr. Feazell is the President and Chief Executive Officer of QualVal Health Systems, Inc.,
the parent company of several subsidiary companies, which he founded in 1973. Mr. Feazell
and his companies are recognized nationally for innovation of risk and quality management
systems, technologies in health care that focus on clinical strategies to improve the quality
and outcomes of patient care. Mr. Feazell received his B.S. from Duke University and his
J.D. from the University of Denver College of Law.
***Michael W. Paddock is a health care lawyer and an associate of the law firm Hogan
Marren, Ltd. Mr. Paddock received his B.A. from Miami University of Ohio, his J.D. from
Boston University School of Law and his L.L.M. in Health Care Law from Loyola
University Chicago's Institute for Health Law.
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States has become the subject of intense controversy in recent years. The
disparity between these two realities results from inconsistencies in care,
not from potential capability. Quality, in so many ways and throughout
industries and businesses, is about consistency, reducing "defects" and
variability in processes.
There is no intention here to join the debate over how many deaths are
preventable in health care or about distinctions between words such as
"error" or "adverse event." Kenneth W. Kizer, M.D., President and Chief
Executive Officer of the National Quality Forum, states that "the whole
debate about numbers misses the point" in the controversy in health care
circles over the number of patient deaths due to medical errors.' The
tragedy in American health care is that it has not achieved its potential to
deliver consistent, high quality, error-free medical care. The challenge for
the health care quality movement is to create and implement the framework
and methodology to become the catalyst for health care in America to reach
its full potential.
After the release of the Institute of Medicine ("IOM") report, To Err is
Human,2 hospital deaths from medical "errors" became the focus of the
health care quality debate. The impact of this report and the subsequent
controversy is clearly caused by its most frequently referenced death toll
figures of 44,000 to 98,000 per year. The accuracy of these figures has
been widely challenged, ranging from criticisms of the methodology of the
original studies upon which the report is based,3 to criticisms of the
terminology used in the report by an author of the original study, Troyen A.
Brennan, M.D.4
There are many intriguing sources of controversy in the debate, including

1. DELorrrE & TOUCHE/DELOITrE CONSULTING, HEALTH CARE REVIEW, PREFERRED
ACTION To TALK, HEAD OF NEW NAT'L QUALITY GROUP FOCUSES INITIAL EFFORTS ON
PRODUCTS TO PREVENT MED. ERRORS, IDENTIFY SAFE PRACTICES, AN INTERVIEW WITH
KENNETH W. KIZER, M.D., M.P.H., PRES. AND CEO, NAT'L QUALITY FORUM (2001),

http://www.qualityforum.org AugHCRO1.pdf.
2.

See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN:
A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, (LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., eds., 2000),

BUILDING

http://stills.nap.edu/html/to-err-is-human [hereinafter IOM].
3. See, e.g., Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due
to Medical Errors:Preventability Is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415 (2001); THE
DOCTORS Co., AN 'EPIDEMIC' OF MED. MALPRACTICE? A COMMENTARY ON THE HARVARD
MED.

PRACTICE

STUDY,

http://www.thedoctors.com/advocacy/ourcause/harvardstudy/

commentary.asp.
4.

Troyen A. Brennan, Sounding Board: The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical

Errors - Could It Do Harm? 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. at 1123 (2000). For a different

perspective of the methodology to improve quality in health care from the systems approach
of the IOM, see also Stephen R. Latham, System and Responsibility: Three Readings of the
IOM Report on Medical Errors,27 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 163-179 (2001).
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Dr. Brennan's careful consideration of the distinctions between "adverse
events", rather than "medical errors." The quantification of medical errors
and the publicity surrounding it have sparked unprecedented national debate
and consideration of health care quality by the public at large. Lucian L.
Leape, M.D., a colleague of Dr. Brennan's in the original studies and
member of the IOM's committee has stated, "[t]he speed and intensity
with which this report from the National Academy of Sciences captured
media, public, political and professional attention surprised everyone. And,
it is no passing fad - attention to patient safety has not subsequently
flagged, it has increased." 5
The surprise in health care quality should not be the attention generated
by the IOM report, but rather that there is so little known about the
fundamental statistics on health care quality in America. It is significant to
recognize that the IOM figures were extrapolated from studies of the
medical records of several relatively small patient populations dating back
to 1984 in New York hospitals, and then extended to Utah and Colorado
hospitals.
While there may be debate as to the precise rate of preventable deaths in
American hospitals, there is a developing body of knowledge about the
"defect rates" in the current delivery of health care. 6 For example, the IOM
Report also estimates that over one million patients are injured by medical
treatments annually in the United States. However, it is important to look at
the medical literature beyond the perspective of the IOM to understand the
magnitude and etiologies of the challenges created by dis-quality in health
care.

Many important contributions to understanding health care quality
include studies that classify quality challenges into the following three (3)
categories:
1. Overuse - defined as providing a health service when its risk of
harm exceeds its potential benefit;
2. Underuse - defined as failing to provide an effective service when it
would have produced favorable outcomes; and
3. Misuse - defined as avoidable complications to appropriate health
7

care.

Mark R. Chassin, M.D., analyzes the clinical studies in the medical
literature within this framework and then concludes the following reaches
the following conclusion:
5. Lucian L. Leape, Forward: Preventing MedicalAccidents: Is "Systems Analysis" the
Answer?, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 145 (2001).
6. Mark R. Chassin, Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality?, 76 MILBANK Q. 565,
576-78 (1998).
7. Id. at 570.
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As the research literature makes clear, quality problems of all three
varieties abound in American medicine. The majority of these problems
are not rare, unpredictable, or inevitable concomitants of the delivery of
complex, modem health care. Rather, they are frighteningly common,
often predictable, and frequently preventable. Viewed by those
companies that have committed themselves to the most advanced
applications of industrial quality management, the magnitude of the
failures or quality defects in the provision of health care must seem
stupefying.'
Overuse occurs when patients get what they do not need, or when
patients undergo treatments or procedures from which they will not benefit.
Underuse occurs when patients do not get what they do need, such as
beneficial health services. Misuse occurs when patients receive appropriate
health services, but those services are provided poorly, exposing patients to
unnecessary risk of preventable complications.
Insight into examples of clinical quality for each of the categories of
overuse, underuse, and misuse for specific medical conditions and the
causes of those defects can be summarized as follows:
OVERUSE etiology:
Payment incentive, such as fee for service;
Physician enthusiasm for intervention;
Primary care physician expectation of specialist (coronary
angiography, upper GI endoscopy, knee arthroscopy, etc.);
Patient expectation (antibiotic, x-ray, laboratory, etc.); and
Fear of malpractice ("defensive medicine"). 9
Examples of overuse from medical research include hysterectomies,
where sixteen percent performed in a group of managed care plans were
determined to be inappropriate (ranging from ten percent to twenty-seven
percent among plans),'0 coronary angiography and revascularization," and
antibiotic therapy. 2
8. Id. at 566.
9. Id.
10. Steven J. Bernstein et al., The Appropriateness of Hysterectomy: A Comparison of
Core in Seven Health Systems, 269 JAMA at 2398 (1993).
11. See Lange & Hillis, Use and Oversue of Angiography and Revascularization for
Acute Coronary Syndromes, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1838, 1838-9 (1998).
12. Ralph Gonzales et al., Antibiotic Prescribing for Adults with Colds, Upper
Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis by Ambulatory Care Physicians, 278 JAMA,
901, 901-904 (1997). Twenty-one percent prescribed antibiotics to ambulatory patients to
treat colds or other viral respiratory infections, conditions for which they are useless, and the
defect rate was 210,000 per million. See id.
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UNDERUSE etiology:
Financial barriers (i.e. lack of insurance, the imposition of copayments and deductibles, benefit packages not covering preventive
care, etc.); 3 and
Rapid and recent accumulation of an enormous amount of clinical
4
efficacy data.
Underuse of beta-blockers is an example from medical research.
Seventy-nine percent of eligible heart attack survivors fail to receive beta
blockers, which results in a defect rate of 790,000 per million (less than
Sigma Level One). 5 Another example is the alarming rate of patients with
clinical depression who are not detected or treated adequately: fifty-eight
percent, with a defect rate of 580,000 per million' 6
MISUSE etiology:
The medical literature is much less definitive about the causes of misuse
than the other two categories of problems.' 7 Examples of misuse in the
literature include the following:
Errors in diagnosis (22%);
Mishaps related to non-invasive, non-drug-related treatment
(21%);
Mistakes in medication use (12%);
Technical complications of surgery (8%); and
Surgical wound infections (6%). 8
Dr. Chassin considered these quality concerns and examples of health
care performance and observed:
If the performance of certain high-reliability industries, whose standards
of excellence we take for granted, suddenly deteriorated to the level of
most health care services, some astounding results would occur. At the
defect rate of 20 percent, which occurs in the use of antibiotics for colds,
the credit card industry would make daily mistakes on nine million
13. Chassin, supra note 6, at 573.
14. Id. at 574.
15. Stephen B. Soumerai et al., Adverse Outcomes of Under Use of Beta Blockers in
Elder Survivors of Acute Myocardial Infarction, 277 JAMA 115, 115-121 (1997) (only 21%
receive beta blockers).
16. Kenneth B. Wells et al., Detection of Depressive Disorderfor Patients Receiving
Prepaidor Fee-for-Service Care, 262 JAMA 3298, 3298-3302 (1989).
17. The experience and insight of the authors is far greater than the literature with the
problem of misuse; however, this discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
18. Chassin, supra note 6, at 576-77.
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transactions; banks would deposit 36 million checks in the wrong
accounts every day; and deaths from airplane crashes would increase one
thousand fold.' 9
The prestigious Robert Wood Johnson Foundation agrees with Dr.
Chassin's conclusions about how other businesses regard the variances
from best practices by health care. In other industries, leading businesses
view defect-free processes as their central business strategy for increasing
market share and profits. These businesses would not tolerate error rates
comparable to those currently experienced in health care.2 °
What we know for sure is that there is far too much overuse, underuse,
and misuse to tolerate in a complex, high risk, patient dependent, and
financially burdensome industry. We also know from previous studies that
a no-fault approach would simply cost too much to be practical.2 '
One prevalent misconception from the IOM report on medical errors has
emerged in the deployment of resources and focus on preventing
medication errors. The single greatest contribution to health care from the
IOM report has been to develop and install computerized medication order
entry systems. However, as the studies on overuse, underuse, and misuse
clearly demonstrate, and the IOM report emphatically states, the primary
source of medical errors and the greatest health care quality challenge is the
failure to diagnose (approximately 21% of the medical errors). After a
careful review of proprietary databases of liability insurance carriers, it
seems clear that medical malpractice claims data would reveal exactly the
same conclusion.
The more frequently expressed number of deaths from medical error is
19.
20.
RAISING

Id. at 569-70.
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., CALL FOR PROPOSALS: PURSUING PERFECTION,
THE BAR FOR
HEALTH CARE PERFORMANCE
4 (2001) available at

http://www.rwjf.org. Understanding the validity of quality measures is central to
comprehension of the overuse, underuse, and misuse approach to quantifying quality of
patient care. In general, valid quality measures assess either processes (diagnostic or
therapeutic interventions) or outcomes (health states that people experience). Process
measures are valid quality measures when their relation to important health outcomes have
been proven. The frequency with which heart attack survivors receive beta-blockers is a
valid quality measure because these medications improve survival in this clinical situation.
For a health outcome to be a valid quality measure, it must be related conclusively to a
process or group of processes that can be modified to improve the outcome. Thus, the
number of babies born with HIV infection is a valid measure of quality of care because
treatment with zidovudine has been proven to reduce the transmission of infection from
mother to infant. Cardiogenic shock, on the other hand, has been proven to respond to
specific treatment regimens; therefore, deaths from that cause are not valid measures of
health care quality.
21. David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward A Workable Model Of "NoFault" Compensation For Medical Injury In The United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225,
225-252 (2001).
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the IOM's high number in the range totaling 98,000 deaths per year.22 This
estimate of deaths from medical errors in hospitalized patients is
understated, because it is based on calculations excluding emergency
department and same day surgery deaths.23 Other estimates are much
higher, however, when outpatient deaths are included in the calculation.
The widely quoted figures from David Lawrence, M.D., former Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman of the Boards, Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, total 400,000 deaths per year due to
medical accidents and mistakes. 4 The National Quality Forum has, on
occasion, adopted an estimate of 180,000 preventable deaths per year,
including the outpatient population.25 Thus, the mortality calculation is not
indicative of the totality of the magnitude of the quality problem since
patient injury - morbidity - from error has not been sufficiently included in
the public deliberations.
Some indicators of the magnitude of the quality of care deficiencies in
American health care are evident in the following summary:
Medical error results in as many as 180,000 deaths per year and as
many as 98,000 hospital deaths per year (equivalent of 1 jumbo jet
crashing daily) ;26
27
25% of hospital deaths are preventable;
33% of hospital procedures expose patients to risk without
improving health;"
33% of all laboratory tests with abnormal results are not followed
up by physicians;29 and
30% acute care patients and 20% chronically ill patients receive
care not indicated.

22. IOM, supra note 2, at 26.
23. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study L 324 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 370, 370-76 (1991); Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 11, 324 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 377, 377-84 (1991).
24. O'Dwyer's PR Services Report, p.68 (October, 1999).
25. NAT'L QUALITY FORUM (FORUM FOR HEALTH CARE QUALITY MEASUREMENT AND
REPORTING), A CALL TO ACTION 2 (2001), available at www.qualityforum.org/ [hereinafter
NAT'L QUALITY FORUM].

26.
27.

Id.; IOM, supra note 2, at 1.
Dubois RW, Brook RH, Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often, and Why?, 109
ANNALS INTERN. MED. 582, 582-89 (1988).
28. Brook RH et al., Appropriatenessof Acute Medical Carefor the Elderly: an Analysis
of the Literature, 14 HEALTH POL'Y 225, 225-242 (1990).
29. Id.
30. NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, supra note 25, at 2; IOM, supra note 2, at 1.
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According to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the risk of death
from riding on a set of recalled Firestone tires is much lower than the risk of
death from avoidable hospital error. The startling contrast for risk of death
is 91 per million versus 2,917 per million, or a 32 times greater risk of death
in health care.3 ' This perspective states the magnitude of the problem in a
current and easily understandable context.
In the context of the business of medicine, the impact of these types of
calculations becomes quite significant. Dr. Lawrence of the Kaiser
Foundation makes the following analysis:
According to the IOM report, two studies, one done in New York using
data from 1984 and a second conducted in Colorado and Utah using 1994
data - found that 2.9 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively, of hospital
admissions experienced an adverse event due to medical management of
their care. Of this amount, 58 percent in New York and 53 percent in
Colorado and Utah were considered preventable. If these percentages are
applied to all hospital admissions in the United States, the costs of
preventable adverse events ranges between $17 billion and $29 billion
with over one-half of this amount going exclusively toward health care
costs. This figure represented roughly 2 percent of total national health
care expenditures in 1996.32
However, as is noted by Dr. Kizer at the outset of this section, the debate
about the numbers misses the point, and these calculations of such summary
indicators of quality should not be the focus of national and scientific
attention. The failure in the United States to establish the fundamentals of a
market-based health care system with such key capabilities as standardized
measures of quality must be the focus. Further, as this analysis is presented,
the distinction between health care and health of Americans should not be
overlooked when addressing access and inconsistencies in quality care. As
Barbara Starfield, M.D., concluded, "[t]he fact is that the US population
does not have anywhere near the best health in the world. 33
Our consideration is not directed at how poor health care quality is or is
not. Rather, it is upon an analysis of the root causes of deficiencies in
quality, clearly established in the medical literature from the causes of
overuse, underuse and misuse, and from the wide ranging summary
indicators of dis-quality presented above.
31. See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 20, at 4.
32. Do No Harm - Reducing Medical Errors and Improving Patient Safety, Council of
State Governments Health Policy Monitor 6(1): 1-4 at p. 1 (CSG, Lexington, Kentucky,
2001).
33. Barbara Starfield, Commentary: Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284
JAMA 483, 483-85 (2000).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss2/3

8

2003]

Marren
et al.: TheBoard
HospitalatBoard
Risk and
Need to
to Restructure
the Relati
The
Hospital
Riskat and
thethe
Need
Restructure

187

II. THE PROCESS OF ASSURING QUALITY
The solutions to the health care quality challenges are processes of care
that utilize evidence-based best practices and that are patient-centered,
effective, efficient, and safe with error-proofing. These processes must
recognize that value is an element of quality, and while evidence-based they
must be financially logical. This solution must be accompanied by a
companion system for credentialing based on current clinical competence
and managing misconduct or incompetence for all areas of overuse,
underuse, and misuse.
The alarming statistics that are prevalent when considering health care
quality are not the central message of the 1999 IOM report on medical
errors. The central thesis of the report is that errors are caused by faulty
systems, and the solution to patient safety and to health care 34 quality
challenges is the human factors approach to designing safe systems.
Medicine remains in many ways a craft-model, cottage-based industry,
and there is really no such thing in most settings as a "deliberately designed
health care system." Careful study of the several recent pronouncements
from the IOM in both the errors and quality roundtable projects
demonstrates the mounting national focus on implementation of systems
and processes of health care as the initiatives that will be adopted by
purchasers, payers, regulators, and ultimately, by providers of health care.
After a careful review of the collection of reports from the IOM,
including the roundtable quality studies, it seems clear that the IOM is
creating a two-pronged approach to the solution to errors in health care and
improving patient safety: first, selection of appropriate treatment plans
rooted in evidence-based medicine; and second, monitoring proper and safe
implementation once the right protocol is selected.
Dr. Leape believes that another reason the IOM report on medical errors
captured public and professional attention is because it packages what he
terms the "shocking news with a compelling remedy."3 The solution is
that medical errors can be prevented by systems re-design. Leape noted
that:
[t]his idea that errors are primarily caused by systems failures and not
human failures is a truly transforming concept. It turns on its head our
long-held beliefs and assumptions about why people screw up and what
to do about it. It is truly a paradigm shift. Early evidence also suggests

34.
35.

See IOM, supra note 2.
Leape, supra note 5, at 146.
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36

that it works.

Martin Merry, M.D., a nationally recognized health care quality
consultant, (incorporating the analysis of Paul Ulig, M.D.), emphasizes the
root cause of the current health care quality challenge as the "absence of
carefully designed error-proofing infrastructure. 3 7 Throughout the last
century, medicine has and continues in this millennium to achieve
extraordinary scientific advances and product innovation (invasive
procedures, artificial devices, pharmaceuticals, and similar products).
During the same period, health care has seen virtually no process
innovation. The health care culture still features a fairly rigid professional
hierarchy, isolation of clinical care from institutional management, and
virtually no coordinated design of systems of health care around the true
needs of the patients.
Without parallel advances in the delivery of care through innovation and
implementation of processes, the impact of these advances in medicine
relies upon outdated methods of work. This absence of carefully designed
work processes sets up physicians, nurses, and ancillary clinical personnel
to fail. Working harder will not improve quality in this workplace. Only
working differently will succeed. 9
Dr. Merry then concludes that the following items cause the fundamental
defect in the health care system:
Complex health care processes;
Unsupported by a carefully designed error-proofing infrastructure;
Thus relying upon people checking people at the myriad of "handoffs"; and
. Creating a maximum performance capability probably around 4
sigma (an error rate of approximately 6% or defect rate of approximately 6000 defects per million, similar to the rate of lost airline
luggage).40
The subsequent publication of the IOM's Crossing the Quality Chasm: A
New Health System for the 21" Century is an academic effort to provide
solutions to the health care quality challenges. For the purposes of this
discussion, several key insights from this publication are instructive. First,
36. Id.
37. Personal correspondence from unpublished presentations by Martin Merry, M.D. to
Landon Feazell, one of the authors.
38.
39.

See generally IOM,supra note 2.
Stephen M. Shortell & Jeff Selfberg, Working Differently: The IOM's Call to Action,
HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 6.
40. Martin D. Merry, Address Before the ASQ-Milwaukee Metropolitan Association of
Commerce CEO Breakfast Meeting (Nov. 6, 2002).
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4
the proposed solutions are framed in five (5) key strategies: 1
1.
There must be total commitment by all stakeholders to care
that is safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and
equitable;
2.
Ten (10) rules (see below) should guide patient-clinician
relationships with comprehensive systems support;
3.
Designing systems will be premised upon evidence-based best
practices approaches;
4.
All parties must collaborate to redesign systems; and
5.
The "broader environment" (culture) must be changed in four
(4) key areas (see below).

The ten (10) "rules" of Strategy 2 are helpful to considering
board42
senior management-medical staff relationships, as follows:
1. Continuous healing relationships;
2. Customize to patient needs and values;
3. Patient is the source of control;
4. Share knowledge/information with patient;
5. Evidence-based clinical decisions;
6. System must be safe;
7. System must be transparent;
8. Beyond reaction, anticipate needs;
9. Waste of resources and patient time is decreased; and
10. Greater cooperation among clinicians.
Strategy 5 for changing the health care cultural environment is crucial to
our understanding of improving the board/senior management/medical staff
relationships:
1.
Expeditiously apply and disseminate scientific knowledge
and best care practices;
2.
Optimally apply information technology;
3.
Align payment policies with quality improvement, and build
in stronger incentives for quality enhancement, and
4.
Prepare work force to make a smooth transition into a
revamped, modern health care system. 3

41. See INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY (Mar. 2001), availableat http://www.nap.edu/books/0309072808/html.
42. See id. at 61-62.
43. See id. at 145-224. For a concise and condensed synthesis and understanding of this
Institute of Medicine publication, see Donald M. Berwick, A User's Manualfor the IOM's
'Quality Chasm' Report, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 2002, at 80.
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Fundamental to the consideration of designing safe, effective, and
efficient systems that support physicians at the "sharp end" is the insight
from human factors research that we move from the current blaming and
punishment approach to a blameless environment. The solutions equation
must encompass both the concept of a blameless environment, as well as
the responsibility of the board working with the organized medical staff to
credential physicians on the basis of demonstrated current clinical
competence. It must be recognized that some errors are due to misconduct,
motivated in some isolated instances by greed or even clinical
incompetence, which manifests its consequences in all three areas of
overuse, underuse, and misuse. Dr. Leape stated his concern for deliberate
violation of rules for personal benefit, concluding that these cannot be
tolerated and pointing out where discipline is appropriate:
The problem is that we have typically conflated the two, making the
assumption that any error is proof of misconduct, or, at the very least, of
not being careful enough when in fact it rarely is. Experience shows that
separation of the two types of errors is usually not difficult. Good
managers have little trouble recognizing the truly careless or rulebreaking worker. These must be dealt with appropriately. As James
Reason puts it, what is needed is neither a blameless nor a blaming
culture, but a just culture, one in which those who violate the norms and
behave irresponsibly are dealt with appropriately.
A major professional failure of medicine has been that it has not dealt
effectively with this segment of practitioners, but left it to state boards
and the tort system, which, by definition, can only respond retroactively
after a patient has been injured. This, too, calls for a "systems" solution;
a system for identifying problem physicians before their actions result in
patient injury and providing them with appropriate help and remediation,
while protecting patients from harm. In some cases, referral to the state
board for disciplinary action or restriction of privileges may be necessary.
To do this requires hospital staffs to be much more aggressive in
developing performance standards, monitoring behavior, and taking
action to correct problems than they have in the past. If they are to do
this - and we should all pray they will - they need much more support

from both the regulatory and legal establishments than have been
forthcoming to date."
The solution to the health care quality challenges, as noted above from
the IOM reports, must be two-pronged, as the challenges are multi-factorial.
The challenges of overuse, underuse, and misuse are very different
44.

See Leape, supra note 5, at 148.
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problems with different root causes and motivations requiring different
solutions.
Peer review in health care has become undervalued and misunderstood,
and in many instances essentially abandoned in favor of other approaches to
measuring and improving quality of care. Many of the health care quality
professionals who publish and speak on the subject do not understand
problem physicians as clearly as Dr. Leape; others choose to speak only of
the blameless culture proposed by Dr. Reason without referencing his
concept of neither a blameless nor blaming culture, but just a culture.
Some choose to consider peer review as "toxic," inconsistent with a
learning organization where peer review is only educational in purpose,
while others choose to simply acknowledge the problem, then dismiss it.
For example, one of the early leaders of the Continuous Quality
Improvement ("CQI") and Total Quality Management ("TQM")
movements, Donald M. Berwick, M.D., made the case arguing against peer
review as a quality control ("inspection") methodology. 6 In comparing a
"blaming" culture in "Hospital A" to a "blameless" culture in "Hospital
B," a table was created that presented 47false assumptions and attributed
incorrect traits to peer review, as follows:
Table 1. Comparison of Peer Review and Quality Improvement
Characteristic
PeerReview
Quality Improvement
Object of study
Physicians
Processes
Types of flaws studied
Special
Common and special
Goal
Control
Breakthrough
Performance referent
"Standard"
Capability/need
Source of knowledge
Peers
All
Review method
Summative
Analytic
Functions involved
Few
Many
Amount of activity
Some
Lots
Linkage to design,
Loose
Tight
operations, and
business plan
Tampering
Common
Rare
(unpredictable events)
The argument defines "peer review" as an inspection technique not to be
45. JAMES T. REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS at 252
(1997).
46. See Donald M. Berwick, Commentary: Peer Review and Quality Management: Are
They Compatible? QUALITY REV. BULL., July 1990, at 246.
47. See id. at 249.
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the focus of the CQI/TQM model, as set forth specifically in the following:
Reliance on inspection to vs. Inspection as an element of
improve quality
total quality management
The conclusion of this pivotal exposition stated: "[1]et the record show
that in the total quality management of the future the peer review
professional can and should be a key player., 4 8 However, no role for peer
review was ever meaningfully established in the CQI/TQM model and any
effort to achieve the notion of the stated conclusion was stifled. As a result,
peer review was labeled inappropriately as "bad apple hunting," and as
health care specialists, we knew it was being relegated to being treated as
"not dealing with the real issues."
The significant forces of the very real disincentives against peer review,
discussed below, coupled with the excuse not to perform peer review, as
discussed above, have combined to result in feeble to non-existent review
of sub-optimal care in American health care. The dramatic impact of
meaningful and insightful peer review, learning from clinical experience,
has been lost by avoidance. At the outset, it is unconscionable not to
investigate the causes of medical errors and to take definitive steps not to
repeat these errors. America would not consider for one moment failing to
investigate causes behind accidental plane or NASA space events, and even
focuses on the need to have such investigations conducted by outside,
independent review bodies. But more significant, the use of peer review to
improve quality from the perspectives of reducing risk in such clinical
contexts as patient selection and reducing costs has not been recognized and
achieved.
The lone example in the medical literature of using peer review to
improve outcomes and reduce risk while reducing cost is published by the
Department of Surgery at Stanford University School of Medicine.4 9 These
achievements required peer review coupled with positive physician
feedback. Peer review processes such as described by Stanford are essential
to boards, senior management, and medical staffs in breakthrough
improvements in health care quality in the United States.
The early continuous quality improvement insights, however, resulted in
a very compelling and accurate departure from the basic flaw in any quality
improvement process that relies solely upon peer review and disciplinary
48. Extracted from Early Instructional Courses of the Institute for Healthcare
Improvement, Boston; and personal correspondence between Janice J. Ophoven, M.D., The
Crackleberry Group, St. Paul, Minnesota, and Landon Feazell (one of the authors).
49. Cornelius Olcott, IV et al., Institutional Peer Review Can Reduce the Risk and Cost
of CarotidEndarterectomy, 135 ARCHIVES SURGERY 939, 939-42 (2000).
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actions.
The CQI argument postulates that 15% of physicians are
responsible for the vast majority of significant variance from quality and
that this 15% is responsible for 80% of medical errors and defects. If you
eliminate the 15%, you do not move (and thereby improve) the remaining
5
85% of care, and thus fail to significantly impact quality of patient care. 0
Figure 1:
Studying Variance vs. "Bad Apple Hunting"

# of patients

receolng care

15%
Poor

5%

80%
Quality of Care

Excellent

(variare)

Unnecessaryprocedures/care
Readmissions; pooroutcomes
Corective procedures redos

So the CQI argument has always been, let "them," the undefined
"someone else's" of the quality world, worry about the 15%.
The physician-specific root causes of overuse, underuse, and misuse
have, for the most part, not been addressed. The CQI methodology focuses
primarily on identifying variance ("common" and "special cause") and has
not succeeded in many ways, because it has failed to address and change
the major root causes of variance. There is again no methodology to find
and to analyze the root causes of problems, no design to catch mistakes
before they happen, and no commitment to the difficult task of changing
behavior in a fragmented health care system essentially without processes
of care to measure (the focus of CQI/TQM).5' The existing CQI/TQM
movement has further chosen to remain essentially intellectual and has not
established a business case for financial gain inherent in improving quality.
The existing need to dramatically and rapidly improve health care quality,
50. See supra text accompanying note 48.
51. See Proceedings of "Changing Physicians' Behavior", University of Wisconsin
Medical School, Continuing Education, Oct. 12-13, 2002 (on file with author).
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frequently referenced as "breakthrough" quality initiatives, requires
unwavering commitment from the top of the organization. This should be in
the form of new leadership with new techniques - new questions, new
perspectives, and new voices.
The challenge in health care is to recruit leadership to the health care
quality opportunities:
For all its spending on health care, the United States is still plagued with
quality problems in its health care institutions and practices. While calls
for quality improvement have not been ignored, no coherent strategy has
yet been put in place to answer them. One reason for this ...is a
leadership void. A leader could come from any of several groups,
including consumers, government, employer-purchasers, and the health
industry and professions themselves. But the obstacles remain, and with
few notable exceptions, the 'quality chasm' remains unbridged.52
The most frightening possibility for the health care industry and its
professionals is that the leadership (and proffered strategies) will come
from outside health care, as it has in the past, from payers, managed care
and increasing governmental regulation. Dr. Chassin and Elise Becker, a
co-author with Dr. Chassin, describe a possible strategy for some large
hospitals and integrated delivery systems ("IDS's") that are financially
positioned to access the capital necessary to undertake the leadership
essential to this cause. They discuss the possibility of implementing a
strategy that first targets quality improvement priorities that would produce
financial returns, despite payment incentives that do not uniformly promote,
and often directly conflict, with quality goals.53
Recent research confirms that involving all constituencies, including
governance, senior management, medical staff leadership, and clinical
quality improvement in equally meaningful ways is important to a
successful quality program. The study results suggest that leadership from
the top promotes clinical involvement in CQI/TQM. Further, study results
indicate that leadership for quality in health care may come from several4
sources, primarily boards, senior management, and the physician leaders.
The hospital board plays a significant role in creating a corporate culture for
quality to become the motivating business strategy. 5' Beyond the legal
52.

Elise C. Becker & Mark R. Chassin, Improving the Quality of Health Care: Who

Will Lead?, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS at 164 (2001).
53. See id. at 174.
54. Bryan J. Weiner et al., Promoting Clinical Involvement in Hospital Quality
Improvement Efforts: The Effects of Top Management, Board, and Physician Leadership, 32
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 491, 491-96 (1997).
55. See Barbara Arrington et al., Continually Improving Governance, 40 HOSP. &
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accountability of the board, the most important leadership capability is "the
board's position as a nexus for planning, implementing, and
institutionalizing" the hospital's quality endeavors.56 The board further
plays a key role in promoting clinical involvement in quality initiatives by
maintaining the "continuity
of purpose," particularly in situations of senior
57
management turnover.
If the governing board and the medical staff are at the epicenter of
promoting quality of care within a hospital, then the hospital itself, as an
organization, is at the epicenter of the nationwide effort to promote quality
of care. Third party payers, such as managed care organizations, utilize
credentialing standards that select participating physicians on the basis of
quality of care (as well as economic performance); however, these
organizations often rely on the hospitals themselves to identify high quality
practitioners. For example, a managed care organization will allow a
physician to participate in its program if that physician enjoys medical staff
privileges at any one of many regional hospitals (a process called
"secondary verification"). The managed care organization is satisfied with
the practitioner's ability to render quality care to the extent the hospital has
so determined 8
JCAHO, which understandably promotes the provision of high quality
care, is unable, on a ground level, to ensure quality care. In fact, the
JCAHO Standards simply require accredited hospitals to utilize processes
that are acknowledged to promote quality of care, i.e., peer review and
corrective processes. Both Congress and state legislatures recognize the
virtues of peer review.59 These third parties not only acknowledge the
crucial role of the hospital in furthering quality of care, they in fact rely on
the hospital as an organization that can achieve high quality of care.

HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. 95, 97 (1995); see generally Bryan J. Weiner & Jeffrey A.
Alexander, Hospital Governance and Quality of Care: A Critical Review of Transitional
Roles, 50 MED. CARE REV. 375, 376 (1993).

56.

Weiner et al., supra note 54, at 495.

57. David Blumenthal & Jennifer N. Edwards, Involving Physicians in Total Quality
Management: Results of a Study, in IMPROVING CLINICAL PRACTICE: TOTAL QUALITY
MANAGEMENT AND THE PHYSICIAN, 229, 261 (David Blumenthal and Ann C. Scheck eds.,

1995).
58. Robert Miller & Randall R. Bovbjerg, Efforts to Improve Patient Safety In Large,
Capitated Medical Groups: Description and Conceptual Model, 27 J. OF HEALTH POL.,

POL'Y & L. at 401 (2002).
59.

42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2000); Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILL. COMP. STAT.

85/10.2 (1996).
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE HOSPITAL
GOVERNING BOARD FOR QUALITY OF CARE; AUTHORITY OF THE HOSPITAL
GOVERNING BODY TO MAKE DECISIONS IMPACTING QUALITY OF CARE
To the extent that quality of care is a "hospital issue," it remains an issue
for the individual practitioners with medical staff privileges, the organized
medical staff itself, and the hospital governing board. It is disingenuous for
practitioners and medical staff leaders to first proclaim that no quality of
care issue exists, and second, that to the extent one does exist, it can and
should be addressed solely by practitioners. Such proclamations ignore
basic tenets of corporate and health care law. It is equally irresponsible to
assert that only the hospital governing body and administrators should be
responsible for quality. For practitioners, medical staff leaders, and
governing boards (which very often consist of laypersons) to fully
understand the role of the governing board in addressing issues of quality of
care, it is necessary to examine the legal duties owed by hospital governing
boards.
The major jolt to the established, if not divided, relationship between the
organized medical staff and the hospital governing body occurred on
Saturday afternoon, November 5', 1960. That day, a linebacker for Eastern
Illinois University, Dorrence Darling II, broke his leg trying to shed a block
and make a tackle. 6° Darling was rushed to the emergency room at
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, where Dr. John Alexander, the
on-call physician, applied traction and placed the leg in a plaster cast.6'
Shortly after the cast was applied, Darling continued to remain in great pain
and, ultimately, his toes became swollen, black, cold, and insensitive. 62 Not
said the
until three days later did Dr. Alexander remove the cast; a witness
63
11.
War
World
since
smelled
had
he
worst
stench of rot was the
Darling remained at Charleston Community Memorial Hospital for two
weeks, whereupon he was transferred to Barnes Hospital in St. Louis and
placed under the care of Dr. Fred Reynolds, the head of orthopedic surgery
at Washington University School of Medicine and its affiliate, Barnes
Hospital. 64 Dr. Reynolds found that the application of the cast to the leg had
caused severe swelling and hemorrhaging, which in turn interfered with
blood circulation, which caused the leg to become mostly dead tissue. 65
After several operations, Darling's leg was amputated eight inches below

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Ill. 1965).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 256.
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the knee. 66
Darling settled a lawsuit against Dr. Alexander, but maintained a lawsuit
for negligence against Charleston Memorial. 6 An Illinois jury returned a
verdict for Darling and against Charleston Memorial; the appellate court
affirmed.68 On appeal before the Supreme Court of Illinois, Darling
contended that he had established that Charleston Memorial was negligent
in 1) permitting Dr. Alexander to perform orthopedic procedures within the
hospital; 2) failing to require that Dr. Alexander review his operative
procedures in order to bring them up to date; 3) failing, through its medical
staff, to provide adequate supervision of the case; and 4) failing to require
consultation after complications arose.6 9
Like the multitudes of hospitals before it, Charleston Memorial argued
that it could not be liable for Dr. Alexander's malpractice, as:
only an individual properly educated and licensed, and not a corporation,
may practice medicine. Accordingly, a hospital is powerless under the
law to forbid or command any act by a physician or surgeon in the
practice of his profession. A hospital is not an insurer of the patient's
recovery, but only owes the patient the duty to exercise such reasonable
care as his known condition requires and that degree of care, skill and
diligence used by hospitals generally in the community. 7°
In turn, Darling argued that the state's licensing regulations,
accreditation standards, and bylaws defined the duties that Charleston
Thus, the dispute between Darling and
Memorial had breached.7'
Charleston Memorial centered on the duties that a hospital owes to its
patients with respect to the practitioners on its medical staff, and the
medical care rendered by those practitioners, if any.72
The Supreme Court of Illinois found that hospitals had progressed
beyond the era when they were simply large 'workshops' for independently
practicing physicians, that by examining the manner in which hospitals
operated, it was apparent that hospitals did more than simply "furnish
facilities for treatment., 73 The court found that, as of 1965, the average
patient arriving at a hospital expected that the hospital would attempt to
cure them, and not just the individual practitioners acting inside and on their
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 255.

68.

Id.

69.

Id. at 256.

70.

Id.

71.
72.
73.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.
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own accord. Most importantly, the court found that state licensing
regulations, hospital accreditation standards, and Charleston Memorial's
own bylaws "demonstrate that the medical profession and other responsible
authorities regard it as both desirable and feasible that a hospital assume
' 74
certain responsibilities for the care of the patient.
As a result of this watershed holding, i.e., that hospitals are responsible
and accountable for selecting the practitioners that care for its patients,
hospitals had to become diligent in 1) determining which practitioners they
appointed to their medical staffs; 2) ensuring that the practitioners
maintained up-to-date practices; and, most importantly, 3) supervising all
care rendered within their walls, including that of the medical doctors. To
truly and fully grasp the cratering impact of this holding on contemporary
hospital governance and operations, it is instructive that Charleston
Memorial's chief executive officer felt no inhibitions to utter the following
testimony at trial:
As the Board's representative, I did nothing to see that Dr. Alexander
reviewed his operating techniques for the handling of broken bones. So
far as I know, Dr. Alexander may not have reviewed his operating
techniques since he was first licensed to practice in 1928. No
examinations were ever given. I never asked questions of the doctor
about this matter. The governing board, neither through me nor through
any other designated administrative representative, ever checked up on
the ability of Dr. Alexander as compared by medical text books ...I

never made any effort to see that Dr. Alexander, or any other physician
admitted to practice more than thirty years ago, read them.75

Naturally, it did not take long for the plaintiffs' bar to extend Darling as
far as it could. In 1972, an Arizona appellate court determined that a
hospital was negligent in not following up on discrepancies in a physician's
reappointment form. 6 California appellate courts followed suit,77 along
with the Nevada Supreme Court,7 and the Georgia Supreme Court. 7 9 A
74. Id.
75. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l. Hosp., 200 N.E.2d 149, 171 (I11.
App. Ct.
1964).
76. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 340-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the
hospital had a duty to the public to allow the use of its facilities only by such independent
staff doctors as are professionally competent and who treat their patients in full accordance
with accepted and established medical practices).
77. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 337 (1982) (holding that a
hospital owes a patient a duty of selecting and reviewing the competency of its staff
physicians carefully even where the physician is an independent contractor in relation to the
hospital as opposed to an employee or agent of the hospital); Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp.,
260 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41 1339 (1989).
78. Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989).
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hospital was found negligent in not restricting the scope of a practitioner's
privileges after becoming aware of wrongful acts committed by the
physician.' ° Another hospital was liable for not being able to detect a
physician that concealed his medical errors. 8 Clearly, going through the
motions of accepting reapplication forms and filing them away was
insufficient; actual diligence was due.
In 1981, in the middle of the burgeoning of corporate negligence, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court once again informed hospital governing boards
that the buck stopped with them.82 The court noted that while a governing
board could delegate to its medical staff the board's duty to select
competent physicians, it could not delegate to its medical staff the
accountability for negligently selecting incompetent physicians.83 A patient,
James Johnson, sued both his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Lester Salinsky, and
Misericordia Community Hospital ("MCH") for negligence. During a
surgical procedure performed by Salinsky at MCH, Johnson's femoral
nerve and artery were damaged, and Johnson lost the use of his right leg.
Johnson claimed that Salinsky had committed medical malpractice, and that
MCH was negligent: 1) in selecting Dr. Salinsky as a member of its medical
staff; 2) in allowing Dr. Salinsky to perform orthopedic surgery procedures
when it should have known that Dr. Salinsky was not qualified to perform
such procedures; and 3) in failing to investigate Dr. Salinsky's capabilities.
Johnson and Dr. Salinsky settled prior to trial, but Johnson maintained his
suit against MCH."
In Dr. Salinsky's application for privileges on MCH's medical staff,
Salinsky claimed that he enjoyed privileges at three other hospitals, and that
such privileges had never "been suspended, diminished, revoked or
renewed." 85 Salinsky also failed to answer questions regarding his
malpractice insurance. The record showed that MCH's administrative staff
failed to contact any of Salinsky's references and failed to investigate
The record further showed that, had MCH
Salinsky's application.
conducted such an investigation, it would have found that Salinsky did not
enjoy privileges at the hospitals he claimed to, that one hospital had denied

79. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ga. 1972) (hospital
corporate negligence is comparable to that of the owner of a motor vehicle permitting an
incompetent, inexperienced or reckless driver to operate its motor vehicle).
App. 3d 665 (1988).
80. Cronic v. Doud, 168 I11.
81. Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302 (1975).
82. Johnson v. Misericordia Cty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 158.
85. Id. at 159.
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him privileges, and that one hospital had restricted his privileges.86
Moreover, orthopedic surgeons in the community considered Salinsky to be
an inferior practitioner. In addition, seven malpractice suits had been filed
against Salinsky before MCH granted him privileges. Johnson introduced
expert witnesses that testified that hospital authorities, given this record,
would not appoint Dr. Salinsky to their medical staff. The jury found for
Johnson and against MCH; MCH appealed, but the appellate court
affirmed.87
Specifically, MCH appealed on two issues to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court: whether a hospital owes a duty to its patients in selecting its medical
staff and granting privileges, and if so, what is the standard of care that a
hospital must employ in performing that duty? 8 As to the first issue, the
court held that a duty of care is imposed whenever it is foreseeable that a
party's conduct may cause harm to someone.89 The court then determined
that the "failure of a hospital to scrutinize the credentials of its medical
staff applicants could foreseeably result in the appointment of unqualified
physicians surgeons to its medical staff. Thus, the granting of staff
privileges to these doctors would undoubtedly create an unreasonable risk
of harm or injury to their patients.' ' 9 Therefore, a hospital governing body,
as part of its accountability for the quality of all care rendered within the
hospital, owes a duty to its patients in selecting its medical staff and
granting privileges.
The court also supported this holding as consistent with the public's
perception of the modem day medical center. "The concept that a hospital
does not undertake to treat patients, does not undertake to act through its
doctors and nurses, but only procures them to act solely upon their own
responsibility, no longer reflects the facts."'" To support this, the court
cited the complexity of hospital operations, the appointment and
employment of practitioners, and the fact that hospitals charge patients and
are reimbursed for medical diagnosis, care, treatment, and therapy.92
Once the court established that a duty existed, it examined whether MCH
86. Id. at 161.
87. Id. at 157-58.
88. Id. at 163.
89. Id. at 164.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. By finding that a hospital's duty of care was established by a level of
'foreseeability,' first, and the public's perception, second, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
differed from the Illinois Supreme Court, which found that such a duty of care was
established by law, regulation and private accreditation standards. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court refuted MCH's argument that the Wisconsin statutes actually negated any common
law duty of care. See id. at 170-7 1.
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had exercised the same level of investigative care that most hospitals
exercise under like circumstances. 93 The court determined that MCH had
not made a reasonable effort to determine whether Dr. Salinsky was
qualified to practice on its staff and that, had MCH made such an effort, it
surely would have known of Dr. Salinsky's incompetence. 94 Finally, and
most importantly, the court held that:
the delegation [to the medical staff] of the responsibility to investigate
and evaluate the professional competence of applicants for clinical
privileges does not relieve the governing body of its duty to appoint only
qualified physicians and surgeons to its medical staff and periodically
monitor and review their competency.9
In the context of implementing the doctrine of corporate negligence in its
state's common law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court clarified the roles that
the governing body and the medical staff play within their relationship. A
governing body may delegate duties to its medical staff, including the duty
to investigate and recommend practitioners, but it can never delegate the
accountability for any failure to adequately perform those duties.96
The facts in Johnson, however, were convenient for the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's holding. Dr. Salinsky had been appointed after neither
MCH's governing body, nor MCH's medical staff had taken any steps to
investigate his competency.
But what about the situation where a
governing body relies on its medical staff to either recommend or not
recommend the appointment of a practitioner, the medical staff
recommends that a practitioner be appointed, and the governing body
disagrees? Or vice versa? If a hospital is ultimately accountable for the
quality of care rendered within its walls, including being accountable for
the reasonable investigation of an applicant's credentials, what are the
implications for a governing body of a hospital that disagrees with the
recommendations of its medical staff? In other words, have the courts
recognized that it may be reasonable for a group of laypersons (the
governing body) to disagree with the medical staff's professional
recommendations regarding the professional competencies of an applicant?
The short answer is yes.
On June 13, 1979, the President of
Northwestern Memorial Hospital ("NMH") informed Dr. Edir Siqueira, a
neurosurgeon, that his clinical privileges were being summarily suspended

93.
94.
95.
96.

Seeid. at 171.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 164.
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pursuant to NMH's medical staff bylaws. 9 Dr. Siqueira requested a hearing
pursuant to those bylaws. On November 7 h, 1979, an ad hoc committee of
medical staff members was appointed, and a hearing was convened.
Further hearings were convened from November 1979 throughout April
1980, at which times Dr. Siqueira had the opportunity to present and crossexamine witnesses and introduce documentary evidence. On April 16 h
1980, the ad hoc committee issued a written report, determining that the
summary suspension should be modified, and Dr. Siqueira returned to a
"restricted practice of neurosurgery." 98 The Medical Executive Committee
("MEC") of the medical staff disagreed with the ad hoc committee and
recommended that the summary suspension be maintained indefinitely. 99
The Board of Directors of NMH adopted the recommendation of the
MEC.'°°
Dr. Siqueira filed for injunctive relief in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, seeking to have the indefinite suspension declared void.' ' The
parties agreed to limit the proceedings to Dr. Siqueira's two legal claims,
only one of which is important here: that the suspension violated NMH's
medical staff bylaws because the MEC did not have the authority to
recommend indefinite suspension to NMH's Board of Directors, and
further, that NMH's lay Board of Directors did not have authority to accept
02
the MEC's recommendation over the findings of the ad hoc committee.
Dr. Siqueira specifically claimed that the MEC did not have authority to
recommend indefinite suspension to NMH's Board of Directors because,
under the bylaws, the MEC could only "receive" the ad hoc committee's
report. '°3 Further, Dr. Siqueira argued that the MEC was not competent to
make determinations on professional conduct and competency, as not all of
the MEC members were physicians. As stated, Dr. Siqueira also claimed
that NMH's Board of Directors was not competent to make determinations
on professional conduct and competency, as not all of the Directors were
physicians.' 4 On these legal issues, the circuit court granted NMH's
motion for directed verdict, and Dr. Siqueira appealed.
Central to the appellate court's judgment was a statement in the preamble
to the medical staff bylaws that the medical staff's responsibility for quality
of care at NMH is "subject to the ultimate responsibility and authority of
97.
98.

Siqueira v. Northwestern Mem'l. Hosp., 477 N.E.2d 16, 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
Id. at 18.

99. id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 19.
104. Id.
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the Board of Directors."'' 5 Other relevant bylaws provisions included 1) a
statement that the Board of Directors may restrict, terminate or remove
privileges of staff member upon an MEC recommendation, provided that
the member is entitled to a hearing; 2) a statement that the ad hoc
committee's report and recommendations are to be forwarded to the MEC
"for information" and to the Board of Directors "for resolution;" and 3)
other MEC duties, such as "to make recommendations to the Board of
Directors on matters which require Board action," "to review disciplinary
problems" and "to review clinical privileges.., and recommend...
changes it deems appropriate." "6
The court reasoned that these provisions, common to most medical staff
bylaws, in substance if not in form, outweighed the other bylaw provision
where the MEC was only supposed to "receive" an ad hoc committee's
report "for information" purposes.' 7 Thus, the court determined that the
MEC certainly had authority to make its own recommendation. The court
then turned to the issue of whether either the MEC or the Board of
Directors had the authority or expertise to resolve matters concerning
professional competency and conduct, as neither the MEC nor the Board
were entirely constituted of physicians.',0
On this issue, the court once again noted that the Preamble to the bylaws
stated that the medical staff is subject to the ultimate authority and
responsibility of the Board of Directors.'09 Moreover, the bylaws also stated
that nothing "shall abridge the right of the Board of Directors to take such
actions as seem to them necessary or desirable under the circumstances." "0
Finally, the court noted that, under the bylaws, the ad hoc committee report
was to be submitted to the Board of Directors "for resolution." In its most
important statement, the appellate court stated that the Board of Directors
could impose final suspension even if both the ad hoc committee and the
Medical Executive Committee had voted to lift the suspension, as "under
the medical staff bylaws, the Board of Directors reserves the power to make
the final resolution. [Claiming that the Board consists of laypersons would]
neither involve the construction of the bylaws nor change the clear meaning
of the bylaws.""' In so holding, the court determined that, because a
governing board consisting of laypersons is ultimately accountable for the
quality of care rendered within the hospital, it must have the ability to make
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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all decisions regarding quality of care, even if they must supercede contrary
decisions of interested practitioners." 2 This holding is the touchstone for all
hospital governing boards - organized medical staff relations.
With respect to decisions that impact the quality of care rendered within
a hospital, but neither contravene the judgment of practitioners nor reflect
on an individual practitioner's privileges or competence, the governing
board of a hospital enjoys even greater legal authority. For instance, the
President of Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center ("Reese")
appointed Dr. Hawkins as Acting Chair of the Department of Psychiatry." 3
Six months later, a new President of Reese appointed Dr. Hawkins as the
permanent Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry, but did so in
contravention of Reese's Medical Staff Bylaws, as the President neither
appointed a search committee nor obtained the approval of Reese's Board
of Trustees." 4 Another physician, Dr. Weissman, had served as both a
member of Reese's Board of Trustees and as Director of Education and
Training and, in his capacity as a member of Reese's Board of Trustees,
opposed a proposed merger between Reese and the University of Chicago.
After Dr. Weissman revealed this opposition, Dr. Hawkins, acting in his
capacity as the Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry, demoted Dr.
Weissman from Director of Education and Training to Unit Chief of a floor
in the Department of Psychiatry. Dr. Weissman resigned but sued Reese
for the severance benefits that it refused to provide. Dr. Weissman claimed,
inter alia, that the demotion was improper because Dr. Hawkins had been
improperly appointed Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry in
contravention of the Medical Staff Bylaws."'
The court, which agreed that Dr. Weissman's reliance on the medical
staff bylaws was tenuous, stated that "[a]lthough violation of the Medical
Staff Bylaws may create legally enforceable rights in the context of a
removal from or reassignment to a medical staff position, they do not create
'' 6
the same rights in the context of changes in administrative positions. 11
The court relied on two provisions - one each from the hospital corporate
bylaws and the medical staff bylaws - to arrive at its holding: 1) the
hospital bylaws stated that the medical staff bylaws extend rights to medical
staff who concurrently serve in executive or administrative positions with
the Hospital insofar as the professional membership privileges of such
persons at the Hospital are concerned, but not with regard to their executive
112.
113.
1989).
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Weissman v. Michael Reese Hosp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11064 *2 (N.D. Ill.
Id.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *15.
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or administrative positions; and 2) the medical staff bylaws stated that 7the
bylaws are intended to provide a framework for medical staff activities.' 1
The court then found that Dr. Weissman did not have a claim arising
under the medical staff bylaws because his demotion was of an
administrative nature, as opposed to a demotion of a professional nature. '
Finally, the court also stated that Dr. Weissman had only cited medical staff
bylaw provisions dealing with appointment and that such appointment
provisions did not bear on the hospital's removal powers. The Seventh
Circuit expressly affirmed this reasoning." 9 Therefore, a governing board's
ability to make decisions related to the provision of quality care apparently
are not hindered by practitioners' medical staff bylaws "rights" that are not
directly related to the practitioners' professional competencies.
Perhaps the holding central to Weissman is more powerfully stated in
Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, a more recent case from the Supreme Court of
South Dakota.' 20 Succumbing to competition from a physician group
practice's new day surgery center, the governing board of Avera St. Luke's,
the only full-service hospital in a 90-mile radius of Aberdeen, South
Dakota, opted to close its medical staff to applicants for orthopedic surgery
privileges. The members of the group practice who were also members of
Avera St. Luke's medical staff sued the hospital, claiming that the
hospital's actions breached the medical staff bylaws. 12' The physicians
successfully enjoined the hospital's closing of the medical staff. The
Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed; it found that the hospital's
delegation to the medical staff of the power to "appoint and review medical
personnel to the medical staff" did not trump the Board's ability to make
"all decisions relating in any way to, or incidentally affecting, medical
personnel issues."' 22 The court recognized that the medical staff bylaws
were derived from the hospital corporate bylaws and, therefore "any
judicial analysis must begin with an examination of the [hospital corporate]
bylaws." ' 23 Because any and all of the medical staffs powers were
delegated to them from the governing body, the hospital had the "authority
' 24
to make business decisions without first consulting the medical staff."'
The court thus allowed the hospital to close any portion of the medical staff.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota opinion represents the principle that
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
See 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10225 *2 (7th Cir. 1991).
Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150, 153 (S.D. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.

124.
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the governing body, if it is to be accountable for the quality of care rendered
within the hospital, must have full and unimpeded legal authority to make
any and all decisions related to the provision of quality care that do not
directly speak to individual practitioner's professional competencies. We
further know, from Darling, Johnson, and Siqueira, that governing bodies
have full legal authority to make decisions related to the provision of
quality of care that either contravene the judgment of practitioners or speak
to individual practitioners' professional competencies. They are only
"impeded" by the procedural rights granted to practitioners via medical
staff bylaws.
While it may appear to some that these principles of common law
conflict with the explicit hospital accreditation standards of the JCAHO, it
is a conflict in appearance only. For example, JCAHO Medical Staff
Standard 2 states that "[e]ach medical staff develops and adopts bylaws and
rules and regulations to establish a framework for self-governance of
medical staff activities and accountability to the governing body."''

25

It is

our experience that medical staff leaders and representatives who
exuberantly embrace the concept of self-governance and self-monitoring as
within the exclusive purview of the medical staff construe this Standard to
mean "JCAHO requires the hospital to allow the medical staff to govern
itself." The implied meaning of this statement, of course, is that JCAHO
prohibits the hospital from governing the medical staff. Not only is such a
belief wrong (Darling, Johnson, Siqueira, Weissman, and Mahan), it
ignores the last half of the JCAHO Standard: a medical staff should develop
and adopt bylaws and rules and regulations not only as a framework for
self-governance, but also as a framework for "accountability to the
governing body."'' 26 JCAHO embraces the principles of common law
discussed above; those who do not are those who, in their independent
medical staff zeal, misunderstand and misinterpret JCAHO.
On the other hand, recognizing the full legal accountability of the
governing board for the quality of care rendered by the health care
organization, and thus the full authority of that governing board to make all
decisions related to the quality of care rendered, will not alone improve the
quality of care rendered within a hospital. Recognition of ultimate
accountability must then be translated into demonstrated action and
outcomes to assure and dramatically improve quality. The questions that
confront us are these: if governing boards are ultimately accountable for the
quality of care rendered within their hospitals, and are thus ultimately
125. JCAHO, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL
HANDBOOK (2002), MED. STAFF STANDARD 2, at MS-3.

126.
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accountable for the effectiveness of peer review and measuring quality,
what are governing boards doing that has allowed for the current situation?
Or, more appropriately, what are they not doing?
Maybe most
appropriately, what obstacles must they remove to achieve quality
measurement and performance goals?
In trying to answer those questions, two realities become apparent. First,
that we are aware that quality is not being assured to the extent necessary to
reduce overuse, underuse, and misuse, and as illustrated above in roman
numeral II, we have a significant body of knowledge on exactly how to
measure quality and enhance patient safety. The question becomes: is there
something about the relationship between the board, which is responsible
for quality, and the medical staff, which has historically been delegated the
responsibility for quality, that needs to be restructured to achieve patient
safety goals?
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOARD-MEDICAL STAFF RELATIONSHIP
Boards of Trustees are legally and ethically responsiblefor the quality of
patient care in their hospitals; however, they do not have the structure and
function to know the quality of care being provided, much less the
architecture to solve quality problems and to proactively improve the
quality of patient care. It is imperative that we examine that structure to
determine whether the structure facilitates the solution or enhances the
problem.
A. The Hospital Board-MedicalStaff Architecture
The thesis presented here now focuses on the central question at the
beginning of this article, postulating that the current structure of the hospital
governing board and medical staff does NOT promote quality and patientcentered care, and that it is seriously flawed. The fundamental flaw in the
existing architecture of hospitals exists in the form of interdependent, yet
independent and discordant relationships between the hospital boards of
trustees and the medical staffs. Dr. Martin Merry characterizes the various
health care cultures as "silos.' 2 7 He concludes that these silos create the
traditional obstacles to promoting quality in health care. We propose that
Dr. Merry's concept of silos is correct, and we believe that health care
culture traditionally encounters obstacles to promoting quality in hospitals
when the various existing "cultures" are understood in terms of the
following three silos:

127. Letter from Martin Merry, M.D., Senior Advisor for Medical Affairs, New
Hampshire Hospital Association, to Landon Feazell (on file with author).
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* Organizational Culture (our "structural silo");
* Professional Cultures (our "professional silo" including Dr.
Merry's third "Culture of Blame, it's someone else's responsibility"
silo); and
. Fragmented Quality Information Culture (our "informational
silos"). 28
These silos and disparate cultures are each carefully considered and
analyzed below.
B. StructuralSilos of the OrganizationalCulture
The organizational or "structural silo" has evolved to create and
preserve the medical staff as a separate entity, struggling to find and define
some sort of legal relationship to the hospital, such as a contractual
relationship. The separate medical staff is a sacrosanct entity recognized in
the law and insisted upon by organized medicine and physicians in hospitals
throughout the United States. In terms of quality, it is the physicians and
the medical staffs, as well as organized medicine, who first insisted on
quality in hospitals and created standards and monitoring to assure
improved clinical environments for physicians to practice.
The American College of Surgeons in 1917 created the Hospital
Standardization Program."' This program called for several of the early
standards that have led to the present system of hospital organization.
These standards included provisions for a medical staff, credentialing,
"quality assurance" with monthly morbidity/mortality meetings for
learning and improving practice, medical records standards, and laboratory
and x-ray standards.'3 °
The organizational diagram of the Medical Staff in relationship to the
Board of Trustees paints the very vivid picture of the structural silos, as
illustrated in Figure 2, again proposed by Dr. Merry. 3 '

128.
129.

Id.

JOINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORG., A JOURNEY
THROUGH THE HISTORY OF THE JOINT COMMISSION, available at http://www.jcaho.org/

about+us/history/index.htm.
130. Id.
131. Merry, supra note 127.
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Figure 2: Structural Silos of Organizational Culture
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From an operational perspective, these silos perpetuate dis-quality,
rather than promote quality. The forces of this structural barrier to
interdependence and perpetuation of independence prevents any solution to
the fundamental flaw in health care from being meaningfully addressed,
much less solved. After recognizing the significance of these organizational
silos, it is then crucial to understand the fundamental flaw in precluding true
health care quality and the etiologies of that flaw.
The architectural silo of the medical staff is made even more complete
by adding organizational complexity with a massive committee structure
devoted to a variety of matters, with a particular focus on quality of care.
Indeed, in our experience from reviewing Medical Staff Bylaws from
around the country, we have found that many bylaws contain statements in
their preambles indicating that quality of patient care is the primary reason
for their being. The Medical Staff then organizes to look at quality
exclusively from the physician's perspective. Many hospitals have made
dramatic changes in their medical staff committee structures, but the
following example of a recent committee structure (demonstrated in Figure
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3) is not unusual." 2
Figure 3: Sample Committee Structure
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Such complex and overtaxing committee structures are even encouraged by
state medical societies in their model medical staff bylaws.'33
The effect and impact of these structural silos is that they are vulnerable
to all the problems inherent in physician and hospital motivations and
disincentives and turn the medical staff and its physicians inward on
"physician exclusive" issues. In the structural culture of blame, it is
frequently the fault of the nurses or limitations of the system in examining
quality. This structure and the demand of physicians and organized
medicine for physician self-governance, self-monitoring, and self-discipline
creates an impenetrable barrier to the concepts of creating safe, efficient,
and effective systems and processes of care. The architecture further
isolates the physicians from any forces outside the medical staff to attempt
to regulate the types of misconduct and potential incompetence concerns as
discussed.
132.

See

ILL. STATE MED. SOC'Y, MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS

(2003), available at

http://www.isms.org/member.html.
133. Id.
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This separate but equal architecture, however, is not merely a current
phenomenon. The current silo structure of the relationship between the
medical staff and the governing body has been developed over many years.
To fully understand the size of the quality of care obstacles inherent in the
current relationship between the medical staff and the hospital governing
body, it is necessary to examine how those obstacles were built.
The gestative period for the "organized medical staff" began shortly
after the American Civil War, when organized nursing had already placed
its roots in hospitals by pushing the need for cleaner, antiseptic or aseptic
environments.' 34 Cleaner environments, in conjunction with the innovative
use of ether as an anesthetic, paved the way for success rates in a greater
variety of surgical procedures. 135 As surgery became a more prestigious and
demanded service, the costs of traveling to patients' homes became
prohibitive, i.e., fees were easier to develop if the patients came to the
surgeon. As the nineteenth century stigma of being a hospital patient
slowly faded away (i.e., the stigma of the hospital being only a last, filthy
refuge for the sick, dying poor), the hospital became
the logical locale for
36
surgeons to ply their trade in clean environments.
Almost immediately, pressure for admissions was high and hospitals
began to track lengths of stay. Prior to the turn of the century, hospitals
counted lengths of stay in the number of weeks; by 1923 American
hospitals had a turnover ratio of twelve and a half days. 37 Understandably,
hospitals experienced a mission shift - where hospitals had previously
extended their charitable and religious care to providing morally-based
boarding homes for the poor, the active medical treatment of disease and
surgical treatment of injury soon became the sole basis on which hospitals
operated.
As the upper class became aware of the benefits of receiving inpatient
hospital care, hospitals ceased building wards and instead constructed
wings of private and semi-private rooms. "Hospitals had gone from
treating the poor for the sake of charity to treating the rich for the sake of
revenue and only belatedly gave thought to the people in between.' ' 138 As
hospital expansion burgeoned, so did operational budgets. While large
donations persisted, patients (typically
the wealthy) shouldered the bulk of
39
the costs through higher fees.
134.
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE - THE RISE OF
A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 156 (1982).

135.
136.

Id.
Id. at 157.

137.
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Starr, supra note 134, at 159.
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Simultaneously, the typical American non-hospital corporation was
undergoing a similar revolution. Prior to the turn of the century, trustees
and directors often ran the day-to-day operations of the company, but the
Industrial Revolution (and the wave of conglomerations that came with it)
had made such hands-on involvement prohibitive, if not downright
impossible.'4 ° Thus, many corporate boards of that era began to place what
is now known as "executive authority" in the hands of senior and salaried
staff and management. By the early twentieth century, higher-ranked
and
employees ran the day-to-day operations and turned to trustees
matters. 14'
directors only for approval and/or consideration of the larger
In hospitals, the timing of the "board-management revolution" had a
double impact. First, trustees may have felt the contemporary urge to
delegate their operational duties to salaried employees. 142 Second, trustees,
who had previously been the largest donors to the hospitals, and thus, the
chief source of cash flow for the facilities, recognized the impact of private
pay. 4 3 Whereas hospitals had previously depended on the beneficial
donations of their trustees, the increased demand for hospital and surgical
services had led to higher physician fees (especially for those in private
rooms), and thus hospitals became more dependent on income from patients
The trustees were becoming less
than income from benefactors.'"
important than the physicians that worked within the hospital. 45 Therefore,
as the trustees felt the urge to delegate their responsibilities to others (and
be bothered only by issues of severe policy change), it only made sense to
operations to the revenue-producing physicians
delegate hospital
4 6
themselves.
The physicians were more than amenable to seizing hospital operational
authority. One prominent Chicago physician entered this in the American
Medical Association's Journal:
[w]hen the industrial revolution of the seventeenth century began it found
Now we find the
Europe peopled with independent tradesmen....
homeless, tool-less dependent machine operators far removed from the
people who furnish a market for the standardized product of their toil.
The hospital is essentially part of the armamentarium of medicine ...If
we wish to escape the thralldom of commercialism, if we wish to avoid

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 162.
Id.
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the fate of the tool-less wage worker, we must control the hospital. 47
The physicians fortunate enough to seize this operational authority deftly
organized themselves into closed medical staffs that excluded the vast
majority of other practitioners from having the48 ability to practice within the
hospitals, and thus from maintaining a living.'
In turn, the physicians previously excluded from the closed medical staff
opened their own hospitals to combat the closed-staff hospitals.' 9 The
closed-staff hospitals, feeling the force of the invisible hand of competition,
succumbed and accordingly opened their medical staffs to any willing
providers. ° Those physicians already on closed medical staffs complained
that the opening of the closed staffs would allow for quacks and snakecharmers, and thus patients would receive lower quality care. Physicians
excluded from the staffs heard such cries only as a pretense for preserving
status, not quality. But money talked, and hospital boards opened the staffs.
Thus, in the first quarter of the 20th century, physician affiliations with
hospitals boomed. 5 '
As physicians joined medical staffs en masse, the professional
associations of which the physicians were members were taking parallel,
supporting steps. For instance, in 1919, in what experts largely regard as
the formal conception of the organized medical staff,'52 the American
College of Surgeons released a "statement," whereby any hospital could
receive the College's approval - whether its medical staff was open or
closed - but only if the hospital's affiliated physicians were organized into
a "definite medical staff." ' A definite medical staff would only include
competent and reputable physicians that did not split fees, that adopted and
adhered to bylaws, that held monthly meetings, and that reviewed clinical
experiences. While it is instructive that professional associations were
refining guidance on medical staff bylaws and peer review as early as 1919,
one should not regard those developments as the 'birth' of peer review.
Much like every profession, 'peer review' began the first time two
physicians exchanged ideas on how to treat certain symptoms.
While the work of the associations' was not the impetus for peer review,
it introduced the concept into the formal process of accepting or rejecting a
147.
148.
149.
150.

Bayard Holmes, The Hospital Problem, 47 JAMA at 320 (1902).
Starr, supra note 134, at 162.
Id. at 165.
Id.

151. Id. at 167
152. Dennis J. Purtell, Medical Staff in Need of Change, 28 PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE 64
(2002).
153.

Mark A. Kadzielski et al., The Hospital Medical Staff: What Is Its Future?, 16
987, 988-89 (1995).
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practitioner as a member of a medical staff. 54 But not surprisingly, earlier
contemporary studies found that the decision to admit a physician to the
medical staff turned not on matters of professional competence, but rather
on considerations of ethnicity, workability, and background. One hospital
administrator revealed that:
[i]n the earlier days we had competitive examinations, but we had to
discontinue those. The person who did best on an examination might not
show up well.. . He might lack tact; he might not show presence of mind
in crises; or he might not be able to take orders. And more than likely the
persons who did best on the written examinations would be Jewish.' 5
In 1934, the physician domination of hospitals via the organized medical
staff may have reached its zenith. That year, the American Medical
Association ("AMA") stipulated that it would only accredit those hospitals
that required their staff members to also be members of the local medical
society. 1 6 But depression-era economics also saw a great push for
efficiency and structure, and the various hospitals dominated by physicians,
while able to generate revenues, were unable to cut costs. As society
recognized both the need for hospital conglomeration and the physicians'
unwillingness to conglomerate, a large interest in procuring capable
hospital administration bloomed. 157 As hospitals merged and grew in size,
administrators not only relieved the physicians of the burdens of resolving
the more day-to-day, complex decisions of a corporate organization, but
obviously gained power in steering the direction of the hospital. Medical
staffs continued to concentrate on rendering care. The fragmentation of
those that ran the hospital and those that delivered care had begun. The
autonomy of physician cultures, the professional silos (see below) and the
accompanying "culture of blame," or "the responsibility of someone else,"
were established. The silos had been built.
V. SELF-REGULATING AND SELF-MONITORING WILL NOT
ASSURE QUALITY
The modem hospital governing body cannot rely solely on a selfregulated and self-monitored medical staff to assure successful
accomplishment of quality goals. There are significant obstacles that
prevent even a generally well-intentioned medical staff from taking action.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Starr, supra note 134, at 168.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 178.
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A. Self-Governance, Self-Monitoring, and Self-Disciplining
Organized medicine at the national and state levels has made
considerable efforts in recent years to support the fundamental concept of
physicians through their medical staff structure being "self-regulating."
These concepts have achieved a degree of reverence and a sacrosanct
nature. When these concepts are advocated, they are not typically
expressed with reservation tied to the explicit role of the hospital governing
body.'58 It is important to remember that these terms are a product of
history, AMA dedication, and, to some extent, a reading of the JCAHO
accreditation standards. It is therefore necessary to consider the problems
these concepts create and further consider whether they make sense in light
of modem quality concerns.
Jerome P. Kassirer, M.D., former editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, states that a "fundamental tenet of a learned profession is its59
obligation to self-regulate, self-monitor, and self-discipline its members." 1
His assessment of medicine concludes:
Unfortunately, when it comes to setting standards of accountability and
ethical behavior, our professional organizations and medical institutions
have often faltered. In the guise of accountability, their efforts have often
yielded lax standards that were intentionally and flagrantly self-serving.
This is pseudo-accountability. When such deceptive practices are
uncovered, the public reacts - sometimes overreacts - and so do

legislators. The aspirations of our profession would be better served if
we set our standards of self-regulation unimpeachably high.'60
Recent deliberations by an international task force (the Medical
Professionalism Project of the ABIM Foundation, ACP-ASIM Foundation,
and European Federation of Internal Medicine) puts the "pseudoaccountability" concerns of Dr. Kassirer into a much broader context of
professional responsibility. 6 '
These concerns are expressed at the
individual physician level as "A Physician Charter," proposing reexpressions of old tenets for medical professionalism. This challenge for
professionalism is powerfully significant in the new era of patient-centered
care. In essence, the patient has always been the focus of physician care
158. Exeter Hosp. Med. Staff v. Bd. of Tr. of Exeter Health Res. Inc., 810 A.2d 53 (N.H.
2002) (holding that a medical staff is not a legal entity separate from the hospital, but a
subordinate administrative unit).
159. Jerome P. Kassirer, Pseudoaccountability, 134 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 587
(2001).
160. Id.
161. See Harold Sox, Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician
Charter, 136 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. at 243 (2002).
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since the very beginning of the profession and the admonition to "do no
harm." The broader reality
of this Charter inherently includes the business
62
context of health care.1
The heart of the Charter is based upon three fundamental principles:
• The Principle of Primacy of the Patient Welfare;
* The Principle of Patient Autonomy; and
* The Principle of Social Justice.' 63
The Physician Charter for Medical Professionalism is thus a set of three
commitments. The concepts of patient autonomy and patient welfare must
be at the center of the physician-patient relationship. According to this
view, the center of patient care is not in the physician's office or in the
hospital. The center is where people live their lives, in the home and the
workplace, with the physician as an advisor, often one of many, to an
autonomous patient.' 64 Experts in patient safety are beginning to agree and
to discuss that the single greatest contributing human factor resulting in
error and hindering clinical performance improvement is this autonomy
factor. The most compelling work to date 6 on this topic is by Dr. J.
Silverson, as published in the MGMA Journal. 1
Traditional Physician Compact
Autonomy
Protection
Entitlement

New Physician Compact
Customer/Patient Focused
Interdependence
Ownership of Issues
Delegated Authority

To understand why there is a "quality problem" in developing a solution
(or at least parts of a solution) at the hospital level requires an appreciation
of the stressors on the ability of the underlying, traditionally independent
medical staff s ability to apply correction. In examining the stressors
impacting the medical staff's ability to implement modem quality
measures, we are forced to ask the following questions: first, is it likely that
they will be able to overcome such difficulties; and, second, whether the
board, under the current "delegated quality" model, is able to assist the
medical staff in overcoming these quality hurdles.

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Sox, supra note 161, at 244.
Id. at 243.
Silverson J, Kornacki, Creating a Physician Compact that Drives Group Success,

47 MED. GROUP MGMT. J. 54, 54-62 (2000).
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B. Self-Regulation and the Difficulties of Implementing Quality
Management
Physicians are not the logical candidates to lead the charge toward
developing these essential systems and processes of care. Thus, the
organizational structure isolating them from hospital quality initiatives and
depriving the hospital "silo" of physician involvement for a multidisciplinary approach is the single most significant obstacle to this national
consensus for impacting quality. Even at the level of attempting to get
physicians to cooperate and adopt such systems, once designed, the
challenge with or without changing the architecture is difficult. Physician
resistance to clinical practice guidelines, or any nomenclature that one
would attempt to devise for implementation of such processes of care, has
been characterized into a framework for considering physician perceptions
and attitudes in the Journal of the American Medical Association
("JAMA",). 166 The seven barriers to physician adherence to practice

guidelines have been categorized as follows:
Knowledge
* Lack of Familiarity (volume of information, time needed to stay informed,
guideline accessibility)
* Lack of Awareness (volume of information, time needed to stay informed,
guideline accessibility)
Attitudes
* Lack of Agreement with Specific Guidelines (interpretation of evidence,
applicability to patient, not cost-beneficial, lack of confidence in guideline
developer)
* Lack of Agreement with Guidelines in General (guidelines in general too
"cookbook", too rigid to apply, biased synthesis, challenge to autonomy,
not practical)
* Lack of Outcome Expectancy (physician believes that performance of
guideline recommendation will not lead to desired outcome)
* Lack of Self-Efficacy (physician believes that he/she cannot perform
guideline recommendation)
" Lack of Motivation/Inertia of Previous Practice (habit, routines)
Behavior
* External Barriers/Patient Factors (inability to reconcile, patient
preferences with guideline recommendations)
* Guideline Factors (guideline characteristics, presence of contradictory
guidelines)

166. See Michael Cabana et al., Why Don't Physicians Follow Clinical Practice
Guidelines?A Frameworkfor Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458, 1458-65 (1999).
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*

Environmental Factors (lack of time, lack of resources, organizational
constraints, lack of reimbursement, and perceived increases in malpractice
liability). 167
Measurement of clinical performance will inevitably shift from the
current "implicit model"'16 to an "explicit model" (or at least some
combination) measuring performance against agreed evidence-based best
practice models. As peer review and clinical performance measurement
evolve from professional judgment in the current implicit model, peer
review in standardized and objective processes will be a critical transition in
any performance improvement plan and implementation initiative.
The second major barrier to self-regulated medical staffs being solely
responsible for quality, as delegated by the board, is that physicians neither
provide, nor are they responsible for all aspects of patient care. Health care
is delivered by teams of clinical professionals.
The patient care in "silo 2" by those from "Hospital Functions" in
Figure 2 above is beyond the purview of the medical staff. Quality
measurement and performance improvement extends far beyond the
physicians, who must rely upon these institutional elements and senior
management to provide quality care to their patients. However, just as this
responsibility for care is fragmented, in an organization that depends upon
having systems and processes, so is the information for quality performance
measurement fragmented. It is literally impossible for the medical staff to
develop such quality data, integrate it into their quality processes, and to be
responsible to the board for implementing necessary improvements.
Health care quality has developed in part as a "solution de jur"
enterprise, and the process of measuring and improving quality is
comprised of a variety of techniques and approaches. The result is an
extremely data-driven but disconnected and fragmented "system." Quality
initiatives that exist in many hospitals might include the following gamut of
quality activities and databases:
Peer review with clinical indicators;
Performance measures;
Core measures;
Quality variance analysis (CQIITQM);
Patient safety programs, including near miss reporting;
Root cause and sentinel event analysis;
Special studies;
Utilization management/resource use analysis;

167. Id.
168. Robert H. Brook et al., Special Communication: Health System Reform and
Quality, 276 JAMA 476, 476-80 (1996).
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• Case management;
• Benchmarking and quality "dashboards;"
• Risk management and incident reporting; and
* Administrative database analysis, including related software
products.
The crucial defect in this disparate system of quality, risk, and utilization
data is that these are essentially "silos" of information. Few if any
hospitals and medical organizations are proficient at aggregating this data
and converting it to precise information to identify the quality challenges
of the organization. Continuous improvement and targeted monitoring are
equally difficult.
The result is that the Board receives very scant and often meaningless
data with little or no insight into the clinical quality challenges and
opportunities of the organization. The good news is that the Board is rarely
"burdened by insight." The bad news is that the Board is deprived of any
meaningful oversight opportunity, and the appearance of authority and
responsibility is illusory.
The responsibility for medical staff membership and privileges within
the Board authority for credentialing also extends beyond the limits of data
available to the medical staff. An insightful physician-specific practice
profile, as recommended by Daniel A. Lang, M.D., 69 demands comprehensive quality information from throughout the health care organization.
The challenges of providing quality data to the Board have become more
serious since the 1OM report and the recognition of quality analysis
techniques, such as root cause analysis. Take the example of mortality data.
A customary model for presenting mortality rates (deaths as a percentage of
discharges) is to divide deaths into categories for "expected" and
"unexpected" (after peer review to determine the cases for each category).
This data is often broken down by quarters, with year-to-date totals, and
benchmarked against other mortality rates, perhaps with comments as
analysis of trends. 70 After the public nature of the IOM report on medical
error and preventable deaths, prudent Boards will want to know which of
these deaths were deemed "preventable," what measures have been taken
to analyze the root causes of these preventable deaths, and what measures
have been taken to assure that such a death does not reoccur. Most likely,
this information will be requested on a monthly basis to eliminate
unnecessary time delay. Reporting quality information to the Board has
169. See DANIEL A. LANG, MEDICAL STAFF
PERFORMANCE IN THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE (2000).

PEER

REVIEW:

MOTIVATION

AND

170. See Barry S. Bader, Informing the Board About Quality, Keys to Better Governance
Through Better Information 45 (1991) (published jointly by the Hosp. Trustee Ass'n of Pa.
and Bader & Associates).
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arguably become much more comprehensive and demanding. And without
question, the challenge of measuring and improving quality has moved far
beyond the exclusive purview of a self-regulated medical staff.
With this insight into the disincentives for physician commitment to
quality initiatives and the need for continued development of new
technologies for measuring and improving health care, the concept of a
complete delegation of quality responsibility to the medical staff by the
governing body begins to seem preposterous. Examined further, however,
it is clear that such a delegation is irresponsible and ill-fated by any hospital
governing body. The emphasis on the fundamental flaw in health care
quality and patient safety must be on the absence of carefully designed and
error-proofing systems and processes of care in the health care
infrastructure.
Clearly, there is no guarantee that the organized medical staff of a
hospital is motivated, prepared, or knowledgeable and without conflict to be
the catalyst or engineer for designing, implementing, monitoring, and
continuously improving processes of care. Physicians are essential to such
process design and use, but they cannot in the current environment and state
of health care be expected to be the sole participants in such endeavors.
However, developing processes of care is the future for measuring health
care quality. Indeed, electronic medical records and quality of care
software products in the future will require embedded clinical knowledge
into work processes at point of service in real time.
VI.

THE STRUCTURAL SOLUTION: REVISING HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL
STAFF BYLAWS

A. HospitalBylaws
The concept that quality is a responsibility shared by the governing body
and the medical staff is probably readily acceptable to all health care
constituencies. Nonetheless, physician associations fail to advocate that the
governing body is fundamentally responsible, but rather cling to the selfgoverning, self-monitoring notion when advising their members as to how
to structure medical staff bylaws.' 71 While the AMA admits to the
hospital's responsibility in certain sections of its proposed bylaws, clearly
the loudest message coming from the AMA and state medical societies is
tremendously weighted in favor of self-governance and diminishes the
importance of the role of the governing board. For example, the AMA

171. AM. MED. ASS'N, PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL STAFF ORGANIZATION BYLAWS
11 (2d ed. 2002).
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provides the following sample medical staff bylaw regarding "purpose:"
The medical staff is organized to promote quality and to improve the
quality of care delivered in this institution. Recognizing its responsibility
for the overall quality of clinical services provided by its members, the
medical staff organizes itself for the purpose of self-governance in
conformity with these bylaws. These bylaws are binding on the medical
staff and the hospital.'
As the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated in Mahan, all medical staff
duties are those delegated to it by the hospital, and thus any analysis of the
impact of bylaws must begin with an analysis of hospital bylaws.'
The
first hospital bylaw, with respect to the medical staff, should state that the
hospital, or the corporate entity, organizes the medical staff. It is not
uncommon to see existing hospital bylaws that merely discuss the
interrelations of the hospital and the medical staff, i.e., that are silent as to
the conception of the hospital's organized medical staff. Like all good
corporate bylaws, hospital bylaws discuss the organization and membership
of the corporation, i.e., the hospital itself. Good hospital bylaws, then,
should also discuss the organization and membership of the organized
medical staff.
Thus, the hospital bylaws should have a provision which clarifies that the
governing body organizes the practitioners with privileges at the hospital
into a medical staff, under medical staff bylaws approved by the governing
body; that, when necessary, the medical staff bylaws will be revised to
reflect the hospital's current practices with respect to medical staff
organization and functions; that the governing body only considers medical
staff recommendations regarding appointments to the medical staff; and that
each member of the medical staff has appropriate authority and
responsibility for the care of his or her patients, subject to the limitations
contained in both the hospital bylaws and the bylaws, rules, and regulations
of the medical staff.
Directly following the hospital bylaw provision that organizes the
medical staff, the hospital should explicitly detail the duties that it delegates
to the medical staff. It is typical, but unfortunate, to see hospital bylaws
that simply state "the medical staff is responsible for the quality of care
rendered within the hospital." Such a provision is overly abbreviated and
perpetuates the misunderstanding that the medical staff's duties are owed
solely to patients, when in reality they are owed to both patients and the
governing body.
Thus, the list of medical staff duties should be exhaustive. For instance,
172.

Id. at ll.

173.

See Mahan, 621 N.W.2d at 153.
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with respect to issues pertaining to quality of care, the bylaws should state
that the governing body assigns to the medical staff the responsibility for 1)
providing appropriate professional care to the hospital's patients, with the
full and complete understanding that the governing body maintains the
ultimate authority and responsibility for the quality of care provided in the
hospital; 2) ensuring that only a member of the medical staff with admitting
privileges admits patients to the hospital; and 3) ensuring that only
appropriately licensed practitioners with clinical privileges are directly
responsible for a patient's diagnosis and treatment.
However, the hospital should further expand upon the medical staff's
duties. The medical staff should be charged with the responsibility of
developing appropriate standards of professional care within each of the
medical staff departments, and should report them to the governing body.
The medical staff should further be responsible for the continuing review
and appraisal of the quality of care rendered within the hospital, as
compared against developed standards, including the identification and
resolution of problems and the identification of opportunities for improving
patient care. The medical staff should be responsible for enforcing these
standards.
Much like the definition of 'services' in a thorough services agreement,
the hospital should use a fine-tooth comb in describing the duties and
responsibilities that it delegates to the medical staff. This clarifies, for the
medical staff, the role of the governing body and, for the governing body,
the role of the medical staff. Once the duties and responsibilities are
defined, the hospital bylaws should state that the governing body retains the
ability to rescind any and all delegated duties if the medical staff fails to
perform. This concept, recognized by common law (Siqueira), is rarely
implemented in existing hospital bylaws. The following is a good example
of a potential medical staff bylaw provision regarding the governing body's
ability to rescind its delegation of quality responsibilities:
Any delegation or assignment of responsibility or authority from the
governing body is conditioned upon the presumption that the governing
body, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and accreditation standards, is responsible for effective quality assurance. Therefore,
to the extent that the governing body in its discretion believes that the
medical staff or its leadership fails to act fully and completely in
accordance with the medical staff bylaws and the hospital bylaws with
respect to any delegated or assigned responsibility or authority, the
governing body retains the right to rescind any such delegation or
assignment and take all actions necessary to assure quality, to include,
without limitation, establishment of quality systems, development of
policies and procedures for medical staff actions, appointment and
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removal of medical staff officers, and amendment of medical staff
bylaws.
B. Medical Staff Bylaws
Once the contours of the medical staff's duties and responsibilities are
defined in the hospital bylaws, and the scope and boundaries of the staff's
powers are clarified, it is then necessary to more fully examine the
relationship between the governing body and the medical staff, i.e., the
medical staff bylaws should be drafted or, more likely, amended. There are
standard medical staff bylaw provisions that should be common to all
medical staff bylaws, but with respect to the quality of care responsibilities
delegated in the hospital bylaws, certain provisions are necessary to ensure
a fundamentally sound relationship between the governing body and the
medical staff.
First, the medical staff bylaws must immediately clarify that, in light of
the governing Board's ultimate accountability for the quality of care, the
delegated responsibilities regarding quality care are entirely contingent
upon the medical staff's demonstrated performance of that responsibility.
The language used in the medical staff bylaws should mirror or closely
follow the pertinent provision of the hospital bylaws. It is important that
this language is included in both the hospital and medical staff bylaws, as it
is more likely that the individual practitioners take a copy of the medical
staff bylaws home with them (as opposed to the hospital bylaws), and it is
certain that the practitioners have agreed, in writing, to adhere to the
medical staff bylaws. Not only the organized medical staff, but also the
individual practitioners that constitute the medical staff, should be
cognizant of their roles within the organization. Sample language could be:
It is the express intent that the medical staff shall perform all medical
staff responsibilities set forth in these bylaws in accordance with the
terms of these bylaws, without intervention from the governing body,
except as specified in these bylaws. However, the governing body
specifically reserves the authority to take any direct action that is
appropriate with respect to any individual appointed to the medical staff
or given clinical privileges or the right to practice in the hospital. Such
actions taken by the governing body shall follow the procedures outlined
in these bylaws. The delegation of the medical staff's responsibilities is
conditioned upon the presumption that the governing body, in accordance
with applicable laws and regulations and accreditation standards, is
responsible for effective quality improvement. Therefore, to the extent
that the governing body, in its discretion, believes that the medical staff
or its leadership fails to act fully and completely in accordance with the
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medical staff bylaws and the bylaws of the hospital with respect to any
delegated or assigned responsibility or authority, the governing body
retains the right to rescind any such delegation or assignment and take all
actions necessary to assure quality, and to include, without limitation,
establishment of quality systems, development of policies and procedures
for medical staff actions, appointment and removal of medical staff
officers, and amendment of medical staff bylaws.
Second, it is important to further the dual goals of 1) integrating the
governing body and medical staff with respect to managing the quality of
care rendered within the hospital;' 74 and 2) creating universal recognition
that the duties delegated to the medical staff by the governing body are nonexclusive. For this reason, the medical staff bylaws may be amended to
create a multidisciplinary quality improvement committee organized to
monitor and improve quality. Its purpose should be to assure that the
medical staff and hospital are fulfilling their responsibility to maintain
quality patient care and are accountable for quality improvement activities.
This quality improvement committee must report directly to the Board of
Trustees. Its membership must consist of at least one member of the
governing body, certain hospital administrators (including the chief
executive officer), certain medical staff leaders, including the department
chairpersons, and at least one nursing representative. This joint quality
committee must also be responsible for the following sub-committees:
Medical
Board

I Board member and 5
appointees (VPMA; VP Pt.
Care; Dir. Quality Mgmt.;
UM rep., and 1 from other
clinical area)

Pharmacy &
Therapeutics

Executive
Committee
]5 physician appointees
representing major
departments
Total Quality
Committee

Infection
Control

Chair: Appointed by
CEO & President of
Medical Staff

Blood
Usage

Utilization
Management

174. See, e.g., Dennis J. Purtell, Medical Staff in Need of Change - Explore A
Revolutionary Way to Reorganize Your Medical Staff, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE 64, 66 (2002)
(integrate governing body and medical staff in leadership decisions).
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The functional duties of this committee are to provide the governing
board and medical staff with quality dashboards and benchmarking, peer
review clinical indicators, performance measures, an administrative
database, core measures, variance analyses (CQI/TQM), patient safety/near
miss reporting, risk management/incident reporting, sentinel event/root
cause analyses, utilization/resource use analyses, and other special studies.
This scenario is in contrast to the earlier diagram, wherein all quality
committees lead to the medical executive committee, and not to a joint
medical staff, hospital committee.
Third, the medical staff bylaws must condition a practitioner's eligibility
for reappointment to the medical staff on the achievement of a certain
standard, most likely a "departmental minimum encounter." For instance,
a radiologist must be eligible for reappointment only if she reviewed a
specific number of images within her last appointment period. Likewise, an
internist must be so eligible only if she tallied a certain number of patient
encounters. To further the goals of an integrated institutional management
team responsible for the quality of care rendered within the hospital, the
quality improvement committee (or one of its subcommittees) must be
responsible for defining each department's required minimum encounter
level.
Fourth, the medical staff bylaws must expressly state that the nominees
for medical staff officership and department chairperson positions must
meet certain qualifications and, further, are subject to Board approval. If
the governing body, the organized medical staff, and the individual
practitioners are to perform their duties of assuring high-quality care, those
aspiring to medical staff leadership positions through which those duties are
to be performed
must be able to demonstrate high quality care
75
achievements.
These qualifications must include the following: a record consonant with
and supportive of the purposes and mission of the hospital; teamwork skills
and a positive attitude toward patients, colleagues, and other hospital
personnel; objectivity in dealings with others; a record free from questions
concerning quality of care; an understanding of, and compliance with,
relevant JCAHO Standards, state laws and regulations, and other laws
governing inpatient and outpatient services; an awareness of, and respect
for, the ethical, professional, and financial needs of the hospital and its
physicians and nurses; all appropriate credentialing; the absence of
probation or any other restriction or corrective action process; and a
practice primarily based at the hospital. In any instance, the candidate must
provide all information that the governing body reasonably requests.
175.

Id.
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Fifth, and finally, the medical staff bylaws must reflect the ability of the
governing body to initiate, on its own accord, corrective action against any
practitioner. Most crucial to this provision is a clarification that the
governing body has the ability to resume corrective action against a
practitioner should the medical staff either fail to adequately perform peer
review or fail to achieve a result that the governing body deems reasonable.
This clarification, nothing more than a restatement of the legal authority
that the hospital governing body already retains, may read as follows:
If the medical staff fails to timely investigate a request for corrective
action or submit a written report thereon, or if the medical staff fails to
act upon the request and report, or the governing body determines that the
medical staff's recommendation is not reasonable, using an objective
standard based upon the weight of the evidence available at the time of
the recommendation, the governing body may either direct the medical
staff to initiate another investigation of the matter or itself initiate
corrective action. Before initiating corrective action on its own, the
governing body may, but is not required to, allow the affected staff
member to appear to speak before it. If the governing body itself initiates
corrective action, it shall also specify the corrective action it proposes to
impose. If the affected staff member does not timely exercise his or her
process rights, the proposed action of the governing body shall become
final.
C. The Non-Responsive Medical Staff
The AMA steadfastly defends the position that the medical staff bylaws
constitute not only a contract between the governing body and the
organized medical staff, but also a contract between the governing body and
each individual practitioner. 176 The AMA also provides an abbreviated list
of the states that adhere to this position. 177 But unlike any well-drafted
contract, medical staff bylaws typically do not contain crucial contractual
elements and specifically lack provisions for remedies upon breach. The
AMA's recommendations do not include instances when the medical staff
fails to act; the medical staff bylaw provisions proposed above serve to
remedy any failure of the medical staff.
Invariably, if a hospital governing body is certain that threshold quality
standards are not being achieved, and the medical staff refuses to act, it is
imperative that the governing body act-whether or not these provisions are
present in the medical staff bylaws. If the medical staff refuses to engage in

176.

AMA, supra note 171, at 5.

177.

See id. at 5.
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peer review, the governing body must retain external peer review
organizations in order to assure quality care. If the medical staff does
engage in peer review, but only by going through the motions to 'adhere' to
bylaw procedures and in order to unreasonably acquit inferior practitioners
of charges of inferior practice, the governing body must act on its own and
revoke, suspend or restrict staff privileges accordingly.
If the medical staff is unwilling to amend the medical staff bylaws to
conform to the law, the governing body must make the amendments
unilaterally. To the extent that amendments are necessary, medical staff
involvement is always beneficial. In fact, JCAHO Medical Staff Standard
2.1 provides that neither a medical staff, nor a governing body can
unilaterally amend medical staff bylaws.'78 However, unilateral amendment
may be necessary in the extreme circumstances where medical staff refusal
to participate would cause even more severe accreditation and liability
issues than those caused by the governing body's decision to unilaterally
amend the bylaws. When JCAHO Standards are read as a whole, as they
are meant to be, it is clear that JCAHO would embrace this concept. 7 9
JCAHO Governance Standard 2.4 specifically states that "the hospital's
governing body or authority provides for compliance with applicable law
and regulation." 0
What happens when a medical staff refuses to engage in peer review, or
at least meaningful peer review? What happens when medical staff leaders
refuse to discipline practitioners committing fraud? What happens when a
medical staff cannot muster a quorum of members to attend a meeting
called for the specific purpose of approving amendments to the medical
staff bylaws that are necessary for the hospital to comply with the law? In
other words, if the governing body is to deem the medical staff bylaws as a
contract, what happens when the medical staff fails to perform, i.e.,
breaches this contract? What steps should the governing body take then?
It is easier for the governing body to answer this question once it
acknowledges what can happen if it chooses do nothing. Recently, in
United States v. United Memorial Hospital, federal prosecutors filed
criminal charges against United Memorial Hospital and two physicians,
alleging that the physicians and the hospital knowingly allowed a physician
to remain on the medical staff and continue to perform unnecessary pain
178. JCAHO, supra note 125.
179. See, e.g., JCAHO supra note 125 (stating: "the hospital's governing body or
authority ultimately is responsible for the quality of care the hospital provides. To carry out
this responsibility, the governing body or authority provides for the effective functioning
activities related to delivering quality patient care, performance improvement, risk
management, medical staff credentialing, and financial management.").
180. JCAHO, supra note 125, Medical Staff Standard 2.4.
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management procedures.'81 It is significant that the physicians indicted are
the former Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the Professional Activities
Committee.' 2 These physicians were not accused of submitting false
claims themselves, or even benefiting financially from any false claims.
They were accused of blocking an investigation of one physician on the
medical staff who repeatedly performed unnecessary pain management
cases at the hospital.
Simultaneously, an ongoing Board review of these pain management
concerns included a discussion with a subcommittee of the Board, in which
the hospital's chief financial officer advised the subcommittee that the pain
practice generated $1,300,000 of net income for the hospital during the
preceding three months. 8 3 The chief financial officer later reported to the
full Board that this pain practice accounted for one-third of hospital's
bottom line. The physician leaders recently pled guilty to misdemeanors in
state court. The hospital pled guilty of wire fraud; the plea will be
suspended only if the hospital continues to undergo a strict compliance
program, including external review. 84
Knowing that a hospital can be found criminally guilty for the failure to
discipline a physician and, further, that it is ultimately and civilly
accountable for all facets of the quality of care rendered within the hospital,
the governing body cannot, should not and must not take lightly any
medical staff unwillingness or incapability to achieve high quality of care.
Courts have held governing boards ultimately accountable for the failures
of their medical staff'8 5 and have given governing boards ultimate authority
to take drastic actions;'8 6 accordingly, a governing board must have the
resolve to take drastic action, when necessary, to protect the hospital and
the community from inferior care.
D. The Incentive-Disincentive Imbalance
It behooves us at this point to consider again why a medical staff may not
act and, in fact, why a hospital may not be inclined to act. The delegation
181. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, W. Dist. of Mich., United Memorial
Hospital, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/miw/press/press112601.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2003).
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Siqueira, 477 N.E.2d at 20 (since a hospital governing board consisting of
laypersons is ultimately accountable for the quality of care rendered within the hospital, it
must have the ability to make all decisions regarding quality of care, even if those decisions
must supercede contrary decisions of the medical staff).
186. See Mahan, 621 N.W.2d at 160 (hospital governing body has full and final
authority to close down sections of medical staff).
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of the responsibility for measuring and improving quality to the Medical
Staff is destined for failure if simply viewed within the inherent constraints
of the imbalance of disincentives over incentives for a passionate
commitment to quality care. For the hospital, the negative financial
consequences of a commitment to quality are daunting:
* Cost of full time employees for measuring quality, meeting with
physicians, and the costs of lost time and commitment to resources for
purchasing equipment, nursing and staffing ratios;
" Potential of significant lost revenue for eliminating unnecessary and nonindicated procedures and maximizing coding for billing of conditions
supplemented by complications identified during such procedures;
* Loss of physicians who do not want to be scrutinized when other
welcoming hospitals will accept their practices unconditionally;
* Fewer physicians on staff as the result of adhering to strict standards for
credentialing highly qualified and experienced physicians;
* Significant costs of any attempt to remove physicians for dis-quality for
the costs associated with summary suspensions or corrective actions, fair
hearings, and the probable attempts to litigate or obtain injunctions in civil
courts associated with legal fees, external peer review consultants and
expert witnesses; and
* Risk of inflammatory public response to any corrective actions if patients,
loyal public, and possibly nurses, demonstrate public support for the
sanctioned physician.
The favorable financial benefits associated with a commitment to quality
are difficult to prove, and remote at best, considering the following:
* The relationship between profit and quality of care has been a difficult
proposition to attract chief executive officers and chief financial officers to
become engaged in quality initiatives;
" The clear correlation between reducing length of stay and clinical resource
management have been substituted for previous endeavors to focus on
quality as a source of potential financial incentive;
* Medical liability insurance companies have been resistant to significantly
reward hospitals for focusing on quality to reduce premiums and bonus
payments are relatively small as an financial incentive;
* Reduction of liability for negligent credentialing is perceived as having no
potential favorable benefit, especially from the perception that the savings
is to insurance companies and not the hospital;
" Third party payers have given little financial incentive for commitment to
true quality versus reduction of costs and limiting access to care;
* Hospitals have essentially been willing to risk the extraordinary negative
public notoriety that attaches for publicity from flagrant medical errors;
" Failure to appreciate the financial cost of negative perceptions of hospitals
and their physicians on lost patients and revenue; and
* Public recognition for excellence in quality of care from publicly disclosed
morbidity and mortality data have been extremely limited to date.
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For the physicians, the disincentives to a commitment to quality
measurement and improvement include:
* Physician reluctance to become involved in any potential negative
comments on the care of colleagues, simply from a personal, professional,
and "there but for the grace of God" connotation;
* Fear of retaliation by physicians negatively impacted from any quality
involvement, such as peer review activities;
* Fear of losing revenue from reduced referrals, particularly for specialists
dependent upon referrals for financial success;
* Negative impact on collegial morale within the organization for any
appearance of "bad apple hunting;"
* Fear of exposure to litigation from sanctioned physicians based on
restraint of trade, defamation, anti-trust, and similar legal theories; and
* Physicians are rarely paid for time spent on quality measurement and
improvement but are very aware of the loss of time to devote to the private
practice of medicine.
The favorable incentives for physicians to become involved in quality
initiatives are primarily ethereal in nature and believed to be illusory by
physicians. The primary motivating factor is that physicians are, by their
character and professional commitment to serving patients, first interested
in improving human lives and placing professional responsibility above
personal interests.
Physicians understand very clearly the intensity of these competing
interests within the medical staff. Insight into the concern within hospital
medical staffs for such competing interests is best demonstrated in the
factual basis for the corrective action affirmed in Austin v. McNamara.87
Physicians are inherently distrustful of hospital efforts, even from fellow
medical staff members, to discipline or take corrective action against fellow
physicians. When a neurosurgeon contended in a fair hearing that other
neurosurgeons at Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital had conspired with
concerted actions to shut down his practice, the hearing panel of six
impartial physicians and a state judge found that the Medical Executive
Committee's decision to revoke staff privileges "was unreasonable" and
reinstated Dr. Austin to the medical staff (after 70 hours of testimony and
twelve volumes of transcripts and exhibits). The panel recommended that
clinical privileges be reinstated but conditioned by i) mandatory
consultations and ii) periodic outside independent neurological surgery case
review. 8 9 The court ultimately ruled that the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act protected the process and actions of the Medical
187.
188.
189.

Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
Id. at 934, 937.
Id. at 937-98.
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Executive Committee." This case, of course, is at the opposite end of the
spectrum from the factual basis of bias and lack of objectivity in the
9
infamous case of Patrick v. Burget,"
' which examined the subject of

challenging competitors in an effort to eliminate or restrict competition or
for personal vendettas.
Donald M. Berwick, M.D., and his colleagues observe that the challenge
of getting productive clinical involvement from physicians is perplexing
and pervasive for health care organizations.
Institutions launching quality improvement programs almost always ask:
How shall we involve doctors, who do not seem to see themselves as
players in processes, whose financial incentives impede participation in
project teams and data collection activities, and who do not strongly
believe that their interests are tied to the improvement of the health care
organizations they work in? In fact, barriers to physician involvement
may turn out to be the most important single issue impeding the success
of quality improvement in medical care.' 9 2
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

How does a governing board ask itself, and provide its own independent
answers, to the following questions: does our hospital provide quality care
to its patients? Where are our most pressing and demanding opportunities
for clinical quality improvement?
Key 1 - Educate to make all parties aware, with insight and
understanding, of the Board's ultimate responsibility for quality and patient
safety and the obstacles of the Structural Silo, the Cultural Silos and the
Informational Silo.
* Education - what data to see, what format to analyze, standards for

*

quality, understanding where we are now and where we want to be;
Structure analysis - corporate and medical staff bylaws examination;
Legal analysis to understand board liability and implications of authority
and responsibility for quality;
Develop legal protection for all peer review and quality information,

*

minimizing access by protection from potential discovery; and
Assure conformity with the Health Care Quality Improvement Act,

*
*

HIPPA, and other federal and state laws and regulations.
Key 2 - Analyze thoroughly the Informational Silo and the specific
190. Id. at 938; the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 has been codified at
42 U.S.C.A. § 11101.
191. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105-06 (1988).
192. DONALD BERWICK
IMPROVEMENT 151 (1990).
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elements of the fragmented quality data and information processes to
integrate all quality information for improved decision-making.
* Review all internal and external sources of quality information, focusing
on:
o Analysis of administrative database for complications, volumes,
and referral patterns
o Analysis of the medical staff minutes for peer review and
management of sub-optimal outcomes, considered in parallel
with other sources of quality data from root cause analysis,
patient safety, utilization and length of stay data (resource use, if
available), special studies, performance measures and core
measures, CQI/TQM variance analysis, and other sources
o Analysis of all hospital-based physician contracted services for
quality of care review from emergency medicine, anesthesia,
radiology, pathology, and similar physician groups
o Analysis of external data sources from all regulatory agencies,
state and federal databases, payers, medical malpractice
insurance studies, and all patient satisfaction data, as well as
other available sources
o Analysis of the risk management database for whether suboptimal cases are being identified and quality improved (examine "surprise rate")
o Analysis of credentialing throughput and output for whether
current clinical competence data is considered for renewing
membership and allowing specific privileges
o Analysis of institutional quality studies and analysis from all
nursing and ancillary services
* Evaluate all aggregated quality and clinical performance measurement
data in both the context of what the information shows (diagnosis) and
how any quality issues have been addressed (treatment) for assessment of
whether the information is valid, what issues were identified, and whether
the solutions are logical, implemented, monitored, and whether the "gains"
from the solution are now consistently performed; and
* Review and evaluate whether the sources of quality information meet the
needs of the organization, including how the information is formatted,
benchmarked, and reported to a Board level entity.
The analysis, preferably using a method such as cross-functional
mapping, should include the following basic considerations:
" Who collects the data - supervisor, staff, individual skill sets, to whom
they report within organizational structure?
o What processes are utilized to determine quality projects, priorities, and
design?
" How is the data collected - what software or processes?
C] What linkages and correlations occur (or are intended) between the
activities?
L3 Who receives the data - how is it integrated and displayed (at all levels)?
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol12/iss2/3
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What are the budgetary commitments for each activity?
What actions are taken, by whom, with what impact (success), and how
are they communicated up and down the organization?
Key 3 - Create a formal multidisciplinary body within the Board
structure to be responsible to the full Board for all aspects of quality and
patient safety that is trained, focused, and empowered to rapidly and effectively implement change and to achieve optimal quality and patient safety.
" Create at the Board level a multidisciplinary entity to review and evaluate
all sources of quality information available;
" Develop a working relationship between the full board and the organized
board entity for reporting and decision-making; and
* Assess and develop roles and responsibilities of senior management and
the medical staff within this organizational structure.
Key 4 - Evaluate the performance of each of the components of the new
organizational structure to determine if the quality improvement and patient
safety is working and achieving expected results and outcomes.
* Review and evaluate whether the organization is identifying sub-optimal
care and dealing with any overuse, underuse, and misuse;
* Analyze whether peer review and other quality information is resulting in
improved care and development of safe, quality processes of care and
elimination of liability exposure and sub-optimal care; and
* Evaluate whether the board is receiving and acting upon adequate and
insightful clinical information to credential physicians.
Key 5 - Integrate the quality structure and function at the Board and
Senior Management level with strategic planning for the organization.
" Focus quality initiatives to align clinical improvements with strategic
planning initiatives;
* Assess quality as perceived by the patient-customers in the marketplace
within the context of strategic priorities for clinical improvement; and
" Require external measurement of hospital-based physician practices for
contractual performance assessment and consistency with board
expectations of quality.
Key 6 - Evolve to implementation of evidence-based best practices as
defined processes of care, tested before implementation with "failure mode
and effect analysis" (FMEA) and measured for optimal quality
performance and continuously monitor for determined expectations.
* Evaluate whether medical staff rules and regulations and nursing policies
and procedures are being implemented with performance measurement for
conformity;
* Analyze what standards, if any, are necessary to implement evidencebased best practice models and to measure clinical performance in an
"implicit" model;
* Determine what medical staff processes must be implemented to improve
patient care for the Board to establish necessary standards; and
Ol

ol

Published by LAW eCommons, 2003

55

Annals
Law
Annals of Health
Law,of
Vol.Health
12 [2003],
Iss. 2, Art. 3

234
*

[Vol. 12

Determine what organizational systems and processes must be
implemented to improve patient care for the Board to establish necessary
standards.
VIII. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

Several observations regarding the rapidly evolving health care
environment are critical to putting these quality challenges into proper
perspective for health care organizations committed to surviving and
thriving. First, the most recent report of the IOM, Leadership by Example:
CoordinatingGovernment Roles in Improving Healthcare Quality, 93 clearly

establishes the agenda of the federal government to develop clinical
performance measures for comparative analysis of hospitals to be regularly
published for the public, similar to the recent nursing home and long-term
care facilities. The national agenda to establish and measure clinical
performance and to publish comparative results is further evident from the
development of thirty-one performance measures by the National Quality
Forum. 194 Second, recent pronouncements by Thomas Scully, Administrator
of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, clearly state the federal
agenda to pay more money to hospitals that provide quality care based upon
developed criteria. 95
The national agenda to improve health care quality is clearly becoming
established. Performance measures, far more precise and targeted than
those currently in use by most health care organizations, will be
implemented, measured, and comparative results published for consumers.
The IOM initiative to develop clinical practice protocols and to measure
performance against defined evidence-based best practice models will soon
become reality. Efforts to tie payment for health care to the quality of
performance on a scale to reward quality care will drive the marketplace
toward the value equation for focusing on quality.
Those who gain insight and understanding into quality as a fundamental
and driving business strategy will be the successful health care
organizationsof the future.

193.
COMM'N ON ENHANCING FED. HEALTHCARE QUALITY PROGRAMS, LEADERSHIP BY
EXAMPLE: COORDINATING GOVERNMENT ROLES IN IMPROVING HEALTHCARE QUALITY (2002).
194.
THE NATIONAL QUALITY FORUM, HEALTH CARE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
MEASURES, INTERIM REPORT, http://www.qualityforum.org/news/txhospGrplpublicweb.pdf.

195.

Interview with Thomas Scully, People who perform better will be paid more,

MODERN HEALTHCARE, Sept. 16, 2002.
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